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This research reviews the effects of warranty legislation on procurement in the 
Department of Defense. The intent of the study is to analyze the warranty 
legislation and policies. Interviews were developed to assess the warranty program. 
Program Managers and contracting officials in the military and commercial sector 
were the respondents to the interviews. The conclusions based on this research are 
that warranty legislation has been successful and is an effective method of 
centralized quality control. The research also uncovered problems with 
interpretation of the legislation and internal management controls. 
Recommendations made to the Director of Defense Procurement include: (1) 
possible procurement policy modification, (2) continuous screening of benefits 
derived by using warranty cost-benefit analysis, (3) expanding cost-benefit analysis 
to all major Department of Defense activities, and (4) have existing warranties 
audited and tracked for future benefits. 
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The Congress passed warranty laws in 1983 and 1984 
because of its concern with the quality of workmanship and 
cost overruns on weapon systems. It was noted: 
... that weapon systems often failed to meet their 
military missions, were operationally unreliable, 
and had defective and shoddy workmanship, and could 
endanger the lives of the U.S. troops. (Conahan, 
1989, p. 2) 
These laws require defense contractors to guarantee that 
weapon systems will meet performance requirements specifically 
delineated in their contract. The statutory language however 
gives the Defense Department two very specific waivers that 
totally negate the requirement of a warranty. 
First, the language allows waivers on warranties on 
the grounds of national security. And second, on 
the grounds of cost-effectiveness. DOD must, 
justify before the Appropriations and Authorizing 
committees the use of these waivers. The 
taxpayers' right to see their tax dollars spent 
wisely is protected by the justification process 
and the ability of the committees to hold hearings 
and reject if necessary, any waived warranty. 
(Hearing, 1984, p. 6) 
Currently, warranties are required on weapon systems that 
have a unit cost of more than $100,000 or an expected total 
procurement cost of more than $10 million. 
However, the Secretary of Defense may waive this 
requirement if it can be shown that the warranty is 
not likely to be cost-effective. Both Department 
of Defense and Service regulations require 
cost-effectiveness analyses of proposed warranties. 
In addition to cost-effectiveness analyses, Army 
and Air Force regulations require an assessment of 
warranties while they are still active and a post 
warranty analysis to measure the results actually 
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achieved. A Navy instruction requires annual 
collection and analysis of actual warranty use and 
claim information. (Conahan, 1989, p. 2) 
This legislation is a problem because it was mandated by 
Congress. The original intent was to protect the troops that 
used the equipment, and to ensure that the taxpayer's money 
was wisely spent. Unfortunately, it has also constrained the 
weapons acquisition process by its own mandate. Program 
managers that are in a position to perform risk management 
trade-offs are not granted waivers. This is by virtue of the 
fact that so few waivers have been approved that a precedent 
has been set, and consequently few are likely to be approved. 
Due to this trend, warranties are not being evaluated for the 
cost-benefit to the Government. These facts were noted in a 
General Accounting Office Report 1n October 1989 which cited 
that out of 92 requests for waivers only seven were granted. 
As defense budgets continue to shrink, it is incumbent on 
everyone affiliated with the weapons acquisition process to 
ensure taxpayer's dollars are used as economically as 
possible. Therefore, each of us has a responsibility to 
scrutinize weaknesses in our procurement practices to make 
appropriate corrections when warranted. 
B. FOCUS AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The focus of this research is to examine in detail some 
aspects of warranty issues facing the Department of Defense. 
This paper evaluates the most recent warranty bill passed by 
Congress. It also predicts the effectiveness of that bill 
against the cost-benefit of the mandated warranty requirement. 
It estimates the effectiveness of the bill's approach to 
remedy the problems addressed 1n the Section 800 Panel. 
Additionally, it identifies the confidence that Program 
Managers and Contractors have regarding cost-benefit analysis 




This thesis assumes that the reader has an understanding 
of the concept of warranties. Although background information 
lS provided as part of this document, the reader will improve 
his comprehension of the issues presented here if the primary 
literature referenced is reviewed. The term "guarantee" shall 
be synonymous to warranty when used in this thesis. 
The research is limited to weapons acquisition programs 
where warranties are mandated by law. Evaluation concepts 
used to attain waivers for warranties is the primary focus. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this study is: 
To what extent is the warranty legislation expected to be 
effective in succinctly and specifically providing relief for 
the real-world problems which program managers must overcome 
to success fully structure, implement, and administer 
warranties? 
are: 
Specific research questions to be addressed in the study 
1. How are warranties applicable to military weapon 
systems as compared to commercial warranties? 
2. How does one identify and estimate the value of a 
warranty to the Government? 
3. To what extent are program managers able to request 
and justify waiving the legislative mandate for 
warranty inclusion? 
4. To what extent do warranties impact product quality in 
design and manufacturing, materials and workmanship, 
and performance specifications? 
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E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The majority of the warranty information and background 
data were collected through an extensive literature review. 
The literature search included a computer data base search and 
a review of all related material located at the Defense 
Logistics Studies Information Exchange. Other warranty 
information was gathered by instructional materials and 
personal interviews with warranty administration executives 
from the Army Material Command, the Defense Systems Management 
College, the National Contract Management Association, and the 
Society of Logistics Engineers. 
F. TYPES OF WARRANTIES 
The most frequently used warranties may be broken down 
into two types: commercial and Military. The comparison of 
these types can be seen in Figure 1. This thesis focuses on 
the Military type of warranty. There are a number of options 
in selecting the best warranty for a weapon system. These are 
defined by their specific purpose for this thesis. 
COMMERCIAL MILITARY 
Requirements self- Requirements customer 
determined specified 
Extensive Market Research Limited or no market 
research 
Manufacture prior to sale Manufacture after sale 
Factory authorized service Services performed by user 
Orderly user environment Hectic user environment 
F1.gure 1. Types ot Warrant1.es (Brennan, 1~~4, p. 1~) 
1. Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) 
The RIW has been used extensively 1.n the past, 
particularly for electronic systems. The objective of RIW is 
to achieve acceptable reliability while providing the 
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motivation and mechanism for reliability improvement. 13 RIW 
relates to the concept of life cycle costs. Life cycle costs 
can be defined as the total cost to the Government of 
acquisition and ownership of that system over its useful life. 
It includes the cost of development, acquisition, support, 
and, where applicable, disposal. (Defense Acquisition Acronyms 
& Terms, 1991, p. b-58) The reliability improvement warranty 
is ·a basic provision of an acquisition instrument, logically 
limited to Fixed-Price type contracts with a long-term 
delivery schedule, which serves to maintain the interest of 
the seller 1n the continuous improvement of the field 
performance and reliability of equipment. (Deburkarte, 1978, 
p. 22) 
The advantage to the customer of this type of warranty 
coverage 1s that it provides significant incentive for the 
contractor to continuously improve the reliability, 
maintainability and field performance of his equipment. The 
result of this effort is lower life cycle costs. (Deburkarte, 
1978, p. 338) 
The contractor can benefit from a RIW because of the 
increased profit potential. He may also develop a competitive 
advantage in securing follow-on contracts. Improved design 
and production techniques, closer control of the design as 
production continues, and increased understanding of the unit 
in its operational mode all combine in the favor of a current 
producer. There is also some potential for gaming of RIWs 
which can lead a contractor to understate the initial mean 
time between failure (MTBF) or operating standards in order to 
provide improvement later. (Deburkarte, 1978, p. 338) 
2. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) Warranty 
This is another type of reliability and maintainability 
cost reduction incentive. Mean time between failure lS 
defined as the particular interval, the total functional life 
of a population of an item divided by the total number of 
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failures within the population. The units of measure may vary 
by time, rounds, miles, or other events. (Defense Acquisition 
Acronyms & Terms, 1991, p. B-66) 
With the MTBF warranty the contractor guarantees that his 
equipment will reach and maintain some agreed upon criteria. 
This type of warranty demands not only a clear understanding 
of the inherent reliability of the equipment before the 
warranty can be negotiated, but also requires peak reliability 
with the first unit delivered. This in turn will tend to 
drive up the cost of the warranty. 
Guide, 1984, p. 3) 
(Navy Program Manager's 
3. Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) Warranty 
This is another type of reliability and maintainability 
cost reduction incentive. Mean Time to Repair is defined as: 
The total elapsed time (clock hours) for corrective 
maintenance divided by the total number of corrective 
maintenance actions during a given period of time. This is a 
basic measure of maintainability. (Defense Acquisition 
Acronyms & Terms, 1991, p. B-66) 
A Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) Warranty, is also know as an 
Equipment Turn-around Time Warranty. This is a no-fault 
clause which serves no purpose in the establishment of 
performance liability, but rather establishes a requirement 
for the contractor to perform necessary repairs to return a 
defective or damaged unit to operational condition within a 
specified time period. 
p. 3) 
(Navy Program Manager's Guide, 1984, 
Optimal use of this type of a warranty would be for an 
expensive Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) . A Line Replaceable 
Unit (LRU) is an essential support item removed and replaced 
at field level to restore an end item to an operationally 
ready condition. (Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms, 1991, 
P. B-59) An effective Mean Time to Repair Warranty could 
minimize expensive inventory stocks. 
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4. The Warranting of Technical Data 
This is another type of reliability and maintainability 
cost reduction incentive. Technical Data are defined as: 
Scientific or technical information recorded in any form or 
medium (such as manuals and drawings). Computer programs and 
related software are not technical data; documentation of 
computer programs and related software are. (Defense 
Acquisition Acronyms & Terms, 1991, p. B-111) 
Warranting of Technical Data has received renewed 
emphasis within the Department of Defense in an effort to 
assure the usability of data acquired in the process of 
technology transfer in developing secondary production sources 
of proprietary equipment. Current procedures call for a 
warranty coverage period of three years, longer than most 
equipment warranties. During the three years the provider 
will correct or replace, at no cost to the Government, any 
data not conforming to the requirement of the contract under 
which they are acquired. (Rannenberg, 1984, p. 43) 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II describes a history of DOD related warranties 
and how successful the legislation is expected to be against 
the problems identified by the Section 800 Panel. Chapter III 
describes the methodology used to evaluate the data. Chapter 
IV provides data interpretation and analysis of this study. 
Chapter V offers conclusions and recommendations for action 
and further study. 
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II. WARRANTY HISTORY AND LEGISLATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background on how the warranty 
concept was developed and what impact Congressional action has 
had on the use of warranties within the Department of Defense. 
A brief history of warranties in the Department of Defense is 
presented first, followed by current warranty law, and a 
description of the regulatory policy governing the DOD and 
Army guidance. Presentation of the Section 800 Panel Report 
that discusses warranty provision follows. Finally, draft 
legislation recently passed by the Congress to improve the 
present laws is addressed. 
B. WARRANTY HISTORY 
For many years business operated on the principle of "let 
the buyer beware." Simply stated, this means there were no 
warranties, either implied or expressed, included with the 
purchase of durable goods. It was the responsibility of the 
buyer to determine product quality, reliability, and 
performance. The buyer needed to make these decisions based 
on his judgment and at his own risk. If the product failed to 
perform as advertised, there was little, if any, recourse 
available to him. 
In 1938 the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law and The American Law Institute started an 
initiative to develop and disseminate a rather comprehensive 
codification of commercial contract principles known as the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) . Since its inception, there 
have been a number of changes to the UCC; it was published in 
1957 and again in 1962 as the "1962 Official Edition." The 
Uniform Commercial Code was one of the first attempts to place 
responsibility for commercial transactions on the seller. The 
Code defines the rights and obligations of the buyer and 
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seller in commercial transactions. (Savage, 1985, p. 13) In 
the Department of Defense, warranties were not used prior to 
1964. Only when they became popular in the commercial 
marketplace, was the basic concept transferred to the Armed 
Service Procurement Regulation (ASPR) A regulation on the 
use of warranties was issued in 1964. 
As technology and the complexity of equipment and weapon 
systems increased, it became evident that some form of 
contractor warranty would be necessary to ensure that the 
purchased systems would perform as required. As the volume 
of equipment and weapon systems being procured increased, 
warranties were used as a risk management tool for the 
Government. 
In 1965 a consumer advocate, Ralph 
publicly ridicule the consumer marketplace. 
Nader, began to 
He had discovered 
through intensive investigation that some goods advertised and 
sold were defective. He formed groups to protect the public 
interest of individuals in the marketplace. This initiative 
created the idea that manufacturers' had legal and moral 
obligations to ensure their products met advertised standards. 
These actions created interest 1n Congress. (Legislative 
Analysis No. 9, 93rd Congress, 1973, pp. 2-3) 
In 1973, the Government safeguards included both Federal 
and state statutes. The statutes apply differently depending 
on whether the warranted product is a consumer or a commercial 
product. (Brennan, 1994, p. 36) Commercial products are 
warranted under the UCC. The Federal statute was the 
Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act and the 
state statute was the UCC (enacted by each state except 
Louisiana) . 
Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a consumer product is 
defined to be any tangible personal property which 1s 
distributed 1n commerce and which is normally used for 
personal, family, or household purposes. (Legislative 
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Analysis No. 9, 93rd Congress, 1973, pp. 2-3) Conunercial 
products are goods sold between merchants. However, if a 
substantial percentage (greater than 10 percent) of the 
product sales are in the consumer sector, the product becomes 
classified as a consumer product and is subject to the 
Magnuson-Moss Act. This act covers the acquisition of 
defective material including warranty protection against 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices 1n commerce. 
Conunercial products warranted under the Uniform 
Conunercial Code may not be as restrictive to the seller. 
Implied warranties can be disclaimed or annulled 1n a written 
warranty statement. A refund is not required. In contrast to 
consumer products, conunercial warranties may be subject to 
negotiation between the buyer and seller. Once agreed on, the 
warranty requirement becomes part of the purchase agreement. 
Other defenses are available to both the conunercial and 
Government buyers following the acceptance of goods. They are 
latent defects, fraud, and gross mistakes. A latent defect 
may be defined as a defect that is "hidden from the knowledge 
as well as from the sight and which could not be discovered by 
ordinary and reasonable care or by a reasonable inspection." 
(Arnavas and Ruberry, 1992, pp. 12-13) Whereas latent defects 
are comparatively straight-forward when discovered, usually go 
undisputed, and are otherwise quickly settled between the 
affected parties, fraud is besieged by a host of cumbersome 
and time-consuming parameters. Fraud is an intentional 
perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in 
reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to 
him or to surrender a legal right. It is difficult to prove 
and the burden of proof is on the Government. The Government 
must prove (1) that Government acceptance was induced by its 
reliance on (2) a misrepresentation of fact or concealment of 
a material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity or in 
reckless disregard of the facts, ( 4) with intent to mislead 
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the Government into relying on the misrepresentation, and (5) 
with resultant damages. (Warranty Guidebook, 1992, pp. 2-3) 
Gross mistakes are also serious and is referred to as: (a) a 
major mistake so serious as not to be expected of a reasonable 
contractor, plus (b) a misrepresentation (by words, conduct, 
or silence) of a material fact which was made without intent 
to deceive. (Arnavas and Ruberry, 1992, pp. 12-13) 
During the mid-1970s, numerous Government warranties were 
in use. In addition, a dialogue opened between industry and 
the Department of Defense concerning warranty issues as newer 
and more extensive warranty variants were implemented by all 
the Military Services. The Services supported research 
studies to evaluate warranty applications, and to develop 
analysis and implementation tools. By the beginning of the 
1980s, the use of warranties in the acquisition of military 
systems were only selectively applied, and usually required 
special program office efforts to develop and implement. 
(Warranty Guidebook, 1992, pp. 2-4) 
In 1980, the Air Force issued the first Product 
Performance Agreement Guide which provided a summary of the 
features of various warranty forms that could be used in 
military procurement. The Product Performance Agreement Guide 
was later revised in 1985. In 1982, the Department of Defense 
issued a set of guidelines (known as the Carlucci Initiatives) 
to improve and streamline the acquisition process. (Warranty 
Guidebook, 1992, pp. 2-4) The guidelines identified 
warranties as one of the means for achieving desired levels of 
system reliability and maintainability. 
The Congress passed warranty laws ln 1983 and 1984 
because of its concern with the quality of workmanship and 
cost overruns on weapon systems. The concern was that weapon 
systems often failed to meet their military missions, were 
operationally unreliable, had defective and shoddy 
workmanship, and could endanger the lives of the U.S. troops. 
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(Arnavas and Ruberry, 1992, pp. 12-13) These laws required 
defense contractors to guarantee that weapon systems meet 
performance requirements specifically delineated 1n their 
contract. The statutory language however gave the Defense 
Department two very specific waivers that totally negate the 
requirement of a warranty. First, the language allowed 
waivers on warranties on the grounds of national security, and 
secondly, on the grounds of cost-effectiveness. The 
Department of Defense must have justified, before the 
Appropriations and Authorizing Committees, the use of these 
wa1vers. The taxpayers' right to see their tax dollars spent 
wisely has been protected by the justification process and the 
authority of the committees to hold hearings and reject, if 
necessary, any waived warranty. (Streamlining Defense 
Acquisition Laws, 1993, pp. 2-122) 
The Congress delegated the responsibility of executing 
its acquisition laws to the Secretary of Defense. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was prepared, issued, and 
maintained by the FAR council of which the Department of 
Defense, General Services Administration, and National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration are all members. The 
Office of Management and Budget delegated the administration 
and execution of the Department of Defense acquisitions to 
the Military Services. The Services are responsible for 
issuing implementing rules, regulations, and procedures 
pertaining to warranties. Procurement activities within the 
Services are responsible for warranty design and 
administration activities. The present phase of warranty 
policy in weapon systems procurement was initiated by Congress 
in response to rising public concern about performance 
deficiencies in major programs, and the overpricing of some 
highly publicized components. Congress took action by 
enacting Section 794 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 
1984. A Department of Defense Guidance Memorandum clarified 
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intended implementation. Section 794 and the Guidance 
Memorandum imposed inflexible, omnibus, ambiguous, and 
potentially burdensome mandates upon both Department of 
Defense and weapon system contractors. (Streamlining Defense 
Acquisition Law, 1993, p. 2-122) The ensuing debate 
regarding warranties focused on the appropriate, efficient, 
and equitable means of improving weapon system quality. This 
debate resulted in the replacement of Section 794 with a new 
tenet--the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-
525--Title 10 u.s. Code, 2403. 
C. CURRENT WARRANTY LAW 
Title 10, U.S. Code, 2403, was passed in 1984 as part of 
the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985 
(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 
98-525, 1234(a), 98 Stat. 2492, 2601-2603 (1984)). This 
statute is located at Appendix A. 
A brief summary of the current law is presented for the 
reader's benefit. The current warranty law states that a 
major weapon system must be warranted. A major weapon system 
is one that can be used directly by Armed Forces to carry out 
combat missions. (Defense Acquisition acronyms and Terms, 
1991, p. B-121) 
D. SECTION 800 PANEL REPORT 
Although Congress had previously passed a warranty 
provision applicable to the military departments, problems 
were perceived in its use. In the passage of the previous 
provision, Congress anticipated that the warranty situation of 
each contract would be negotiated on an individual basis. 
Congress determined, however, that the military departments 
had not been negotiating the warranty provisions in the manner 
anticipated. Instead, the general approach of the military 
departments had been to specify a warranty clause and require 
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that it be included in the contract. The warranty law was 
never intended to create this type of simplistic, blind, 
mechanistic approach to defense contracting. (Streamlining 
Defense Acquisition Law, 1993, p. 2-122) 
Congress agreed that there should be enough flexibility 
to give the Department of Defense authority to craft specific 
warranties, and to consider the formulation of exclusions or 
limitations. Exclusions and limitations address situations 
where a contractor has not designed a system. The Department 
of Defense should be able to narrow the scope of the warranty 
clause, if it would be inequitable to apply the full warranty 
to a contractor with limited design involvement or where 
warranty costs clearly exceed expected benefits. (Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 46.701-710) 
Congress noted that virtually no warranty 
exemptions had been issued in the years since the 
previous warranty provision had been passed. It 
stated that the Committees on Armed Services had 
never intended to require warranties if they were 
not cost-effective. Congress also expressed the 
concern that there had been a lack of communication 
between the military departments and their field 
personnel about the appropriate implementation of 
Congressional warranty language and its inherent 
flexibility. With the passage of this new warranty 
provision, Congress believed that the new sections 
would give the military the inherent flexibility to 
negotiate guarantees on a case-by-case basis, 
including the authority to negotiate reasonable 
exclusions, limitations, and time durations. 
(Streamlining Defense Acquisition Law, 1993, p. 2-
112) 
E. ACQUISITION REFORM OF WARRANTIES 
As a result of the Department of Defense's build down, 
Reinventing Government, and Bottom-up Review, initiatives to 
restructure the acquisition process have been of paramount 
concern. The Section 800 Panel of the Fiscal Year 1991 
National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 101-510) 
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mandated the establishment of an advisory panel to codify and 
simplify acquisition law. In response to that mandate, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition appointed a panel 
of recognized public and private sector experts in acquisition 
law and procurement policy. This panel reviewed the various 
laws governing defense acquisition. A total of 600 statutes 
were reviewed, and in their report, 11 Streamlining Defense 
Acquisition Law, 11 dated 12 Jan 1993, recommendations were made 
amending, deleting, consolidating or rescinding over 300 of 
those statutes. (USC, Title 10, Sect 2403, Supplement I, 
1989-1990) The effectiveness of warranty provisions were 
included in the Panel's evaluation. The Section 800 Panel 
identified three functions of warranties: assure that the 
Department of Defense receives a product free from design, 
manufacture, or structural defects; motivate the contractor to 
produce defect-free products; and ensure the Department of 
Defense against the risks of repair or replacement. The 
language was different, but the concept was still for quality 
defect-free products and reducing the risk to the Government. 
The Section 800 Panel's study also showed that program 
managers tend to view warranties from the perspective of an 
individual consumer instead of an industrial buyer. In 
essence, the program manager's belief was that the commercial 
application of warranties applied to the Department of 
Defense, and that they offered the same type of consideration 
to the Government as they did to individuals. In reality, the 
warranty provisions used by the Department of Defense, while 
constructed to improve the quality of the weapon systems and 
minimize defects, had become a nemesis, in that, warranties no 
longer performed the functions for which they were intended. 
(USC, Title 10, Sect 2403, Supplement I, 1989-1990) 
The Government is paying for a benefit it rarely 
receives. The benefit is expected to be in the form of 
insurance to mitigate potentially expensive defects in the 
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performance or design of major weapon systems. This insurance 
claim can only be recouped if a warranty provision is 
vigorously pursued. 
It is asserted that insurance is not a manner 
of escaping the social costs of uncertainty but 
rather is a means of escaping the potential 
variation of those costs. That is the forces of 
uncertainty inflict costs in the manner of a 
probability distribution with a mean or expected 
value and a variance. An insured party always pays 
a premium which includes that mean cost: What he 
escapes thereby is the variance of the 
distribution. Hence, the insurance function of 
warranties does not reduce the costs of uncertainty 
to DOD: It shifts the risk of extreme deviations 
onto the contractor. (USC, Title 10, Section 2402, 
Special Supplement, 1994) 
When a warranty claim is pursued, it is usually done 
through the contractor. This is because if the contractor 
accepts responsibility then his recourse 
Government with its benefit as stated 
is to provide the 
in the contract. 
Usually, this is in one of two forms. First, if the weapon 
system is still in production the contract is adjusted. This 
is done by the contractor. It is the contractor's 
responsibility to credit the Government with its benefit. 
Secondly, if the weapon system is no longer in production the 
contractor is obligated to provide the benefit to the 
Government through the Department of Treasury. This is 
accomplished by a reimbursement to the Department of the 
Treasury. (USC, Title 10, Section 2402, Special Supplement, 
1994) In either case the user receives no direct benefit from 
the warranty. With the stovepipe structure of the Government, 
the burden of proof for the defect and redemption of the 
warranty benefit is so cumbersome that it has not proved to be 
cost-effective. Although the user identifies the defect 1n 
the weapon system, he does not have a full appreciation of how 
to apply warranty remedies. In addition, there are no 
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incentives for him or his unit to pursue the correction of the 
warranted weapon system. 
Warranty benefits are further encumbered by numerous 
clauses in Government contracts that deal with the inspection 
and acceptance of goods. When a weapon system meets contract 
specifications, it relieves the contractor of liability for 
those goods upon the Government's acceptance of the goods. 
The reason for this application is that once a contract states 
specifications and the contractor performs the contract based 
on those specifications it becomes the Government's problem if 
there are any form, fit, or function deficiencies. Once the 
contractor performs to the letter of the contract, he ~s 
relieved from any further responsibility for ambiguous or 
defective specifications. The key is the Government's 
acceptance of the goods. There are three ways a buyer can 
accept goods: (1) by signifying to the seller that the goods 
are conforming or that he will accept them in spite of their 
nonconformity, (2) by failing to make an effective rejection, 
and (3) by doing an act inconsistent with the seller's 
ownership. Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is 
acceptance of that entire unit. (Black, 1979, p. 115) This 
has a completely different application in the commercial 
marketplace. 
In contrast with a Government buyer, a commercial 
consumer has much more flexibility in processing a claim on a 
warranted item. In the commercial marketplace, when a good is 
purchased it may be returned with fewer conditions placed on 
it. For example, the item does not have to be returned to the 
manufacturer; it can be returned to the place of purchase. 
The commercial buyer can redeem the warranty benefits from 
merchants other than the manufacturer or he may return the 
merchandise to the place of purchase. These conditions make 
the warranty provisions relatively easy to process. In 
addition to the ease in which claims are processed, warranty 
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benefits are received directly. The commercial buyer receives 
a refund, an exchange for a like item, or an exchange on 
another item of his liking. None of this is true for the 
Government. The user who submits a warranty claim, does so on 
behalf of the Government, and receives no direct benefit for 
that claim. The contractor's liability is to the Government 
directly; not to the product user or organization that owns 
the warranted item and submits the claim. 
There is an option that negates the requirement of 
including a warranty in a contract. This option is in the 
form of a waiver. When a waiver is being considered, it must 
always be justified by a cost-effectiveness analysis. 
Congressional notification is mandated for waiver approval, 
and authority to grant the approval is held at the Assistant 
Secretary of Military Departments level. The requirement for 
congressional notification and waiver authority held at such 
a high level in the Government stifles attempts to waive the 
warranty where it would not be cost-effective. (Streamlining 
Defense Acquisition Laws, 1993, p. 2-116) Thus, the use of 
waivers to date, has not been fully realized. 
Defense Acquisition Laws, 1993, p. 2-116) 
(Streamlining 
The recommendation of the Section 800 Panel has been to 
repeal the statute, allowing the waivers, or requiring a 
warranty. If the recommendation is not accepted, the Panel 
suggests that the Government use the waiver option more 
frequently, and further, that the Government should justify 
the inclusion of a warranty as a contract requirement. 
(Section 800 Panel Report, p. 2-117 & 118) 
F. THE LATEST LEGISLATION 
Congress' response to the Section 800 Panel has been in 
the form of new legislation. It waived the requirement for 
the Secretary of Defense to report annually to Congress on 
each warranty waiver granted during the previous year. It 
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also mandated that regulatory guidelines be written and 
implemented to encourage the use of warranties. 
Concomitantly, they identified appropriate procedural rules 
designed to simplify the decision making process. This should 
establish a standard approach for all Military Services with 
the authority to deviate from established procedures of 
mandated warranties for weapon 
Unfortunately, the legislation does 
authorization for approval of a 
systems procurement. 
not change the level of 
warranty waiver. This 
requirement, at its lowest level of authorization, 1s still 
held at the Assistant to the Secretary for the Service. 
Holding the authority to grant waivers at such a high level in 
the bureaucracy creates the mandate for numerous reviews and 
laborious manhour expenditures to preform cost-benefit 
analysis and justification for a waiver. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has traced the history of Government 
warranties and current warranty provisions. The principle of 
"let the buyer beware" retains its meaning for the Department 
of Defense until the statutes are either amended or repealed. 
In the interim, the use of waivers, although cumbersome, can 





A combination of literature review and personal 
interviews was conducted in the course of this research. The 
main sources of literature included the DSMC Warranty 
Guidebook; Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Subpart 
46~7; Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS), Subpart 246.7; United States Army Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (AFAR), Subpart 46.7; Section 2403, USC, Title 10, 
Public Law (P.L.) 98-525 of the 1985 Defense Procurement 
Reform Act; and the Section 800 Panel Report. 
In developing the methodology for this research, four 
critical issues were formulated regarding the legislation and 
implementation of Warranty Programs. These issues were: 
1. How are warranties applicable to Military weapon 
systems as compared to commercial warranties? 
2. How does one identify and measure the best method to 
estimate the value of a warranty to the Government? 
3. To what extent are program managers able to request 
and justify waiving the legislative mandate for 
warranty inclusion? 
4. To what extent do warranties impact on product quality 
in design and manufacturing, materials and 
workmanship, and performance specifications? 
This chapter will review each of these issues focusing on 
the criteria of each critical issue. Once the criteria were 
clearly identified, measures of effectiveness and performance 
were selected. The data requirements were identified and the 
interview questions developed. Each interview was conducted 
in a non-attribution forum to attain the most comprehensive 
data. These data were transcribed and prepared for analysis. 
The analysis consisted of understanding all pertinent policies 
and taking each question and all responses to that question, 
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and interpreting the comments and discussing the facts of the 
case that lead to the conclusions. Each question was 
evaluated with the others to establish the foundation for the 
responses for the question. The results were compared with 
the evaluation criteria to ensure conformity of purpose for 
the question. Finally, the evaluation report was written and 
formulated the basis for conclusions and recommendations of 
this thesis. 
B. APPLICABILITY OF WARRANTIES TO MILITARY WEAPON SYSTEMS 
In developing this research, the key question was how to 
compare the intent of mandated warranty legislation to the 
commercial use of warranties. Interviewing current Army 
program managers and contracting and legislative officials 
with programs that had been developed during the time period 
of the most recent legislation (1985-1994), seemed to be a 
reasonable approach toward answering this question. This 
approach provided data which reflected the general level of 
experiences with the Warranty Program. These personnel had 
experienced the opportunity to implement the legislation, and 
to monitor and evaluate the results. To gain this insight, 
eight Army program managers, eight contractors and one 
legislative official were asked to take part in this research. 
The interview questionnaire was developed with the thesis 
questions as the primary concern. Interview questionnaires 
were sent via electronic facsimile to the program managers, 
contractors, and a legislative official. They were asked to 
perform any research required to familiarize themselves with 
the warranty history of their programs and then to answer each 
of the questions. They were to send the answered 
questionnaires back so that a follow-up telephonic interview 
could maximize the transfer of knowledge in each of the areas 
of concern. Finally, the telephonic interviews were used to 
clearly define the positions of each individual. These 
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positions were transcribed and are a part of this thesis. 
C. IDENTIFICATION OF PROGRAM MANAGERS, CONTRACTORS AND 
LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS 
1. Program Managers 
The next question was how to identify the program 
managers, contractors, and a legislative official to evaluate 
effectiveness of the Warranty Program? The managerial 
oversight of the Army's programs are the responsibility of the 
Army Service Acquisition Executive (ASAE). In order to 
identify the program managers, an assessment of the programs 
that had been in the acquisition cycle during the time period 
of 1985-1994 were identified. Each of these program managers 
were asked to participate in the research project. 
2. contractors 
Identifying contractors with experience in the time 
period the legislation was established was a slightly more 
difficult challenge. The researcher referred to the 
"Government Executive," for assistance in identifying the top 
200 Government contractors. These contractors were then 
reviewed for the highest dollar amounts of Army contracts. 
Once these data were isolated, contacting the contractors was 
again a challenge. Points of contact were established and the 
same procedure was utilized to assess their evaluation of the 
warranty legislation. 
3. Legislative Official 
The legislative official was identified by his work on 
the Section 800 Panel Report. His input into the decision 
making process was expected to conclusively identify the 
objectives of the legislation and benefits expected from the 
proposed legislation. A point of contact was identified and 
the same procedure as above was utilized to assess his 
evaluation of the warranty legislation. 
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D. EVALUATING THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
An iterative process was used 1n evaluating the 
questionnaires. The Dendritic analysis technique was selected 
as a way of decomposing critical issues to the point where 
actual data requirements and evaluations could be identified. 
Each question was designed for a two fold approach. First, 
the issues were broken down into a test of proportions to 
determine the overall tendency of the opinions of those 
interviewed. Second, explanations were evaluated for 
consistency and clarity of issues. These methods were 
selected for determining the level of awareness that each 
professional had in the area of warranty effectiveness. The 
evaluation of comments was determined by the consistency of 
the responses. 
E. COMPARING EVALUATION RESULTS WITH THE ISSUES 
The primary consideration in identifying information 
generated by the evaluation was having a clear understanding 
of the conclusion supported by the evaluation. Comparing the 
evaluation results with the initial issues helped to determine 
specific issues that were not effectively dealt with in the 
legislative mandate. This also helped develop the conclusions 
and recommendations by providing insight into what warranty 
1ssues were consistent among each of the interviewees. 
F. SUMMARY 
This study uses the legislative statute enacted in 1985 
and the Section 800 Panel's recommendations for legislative 
change as its foundation. Respondents were asked to offer 
their experiences of the effects of the legislation on 
programs they were responsible for. These experiences were 
evaluated and compared to determine the areas of consistency 
of issues both positive and negative. 
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During the field research for this study, Program 
Managers, Contracting Officers, and Legislative Officials were 
interviewed. After the interviews were completed, the 
analysis was performed. The data and results of the analysis 
will be presented in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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IV. DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter contains the data interpretation and 
analysis. It has two major sections: The first section 
contains the questions followed by the interpretation of the 
data from the interviews. The second section contains the 
analysis of the warranty legislation, its interpretation, and 
its effectiveness for major acquisition programs. 
Interview questionnaires were sent to selected personnel 
who were experienced in how the Government uses warranties for 
weapon systems acquisition. This encompassed 17 officials who 
use warranties in their daily business with the Government. 
Eleven officials replied to the interview for a sixty-five 
percent response rate. 
The interview questionnaire had five major sections: 
Procurement experience, Assessment of the value of the 
Warranty Program to the Government versus commercial industry, 
Assessment of the use of cost-benefit analysis as a risk 
management tool, the value placed on warranty waivers, and the 
correlation between the quality of a weapon system and its 
warranty. 
1. Procurement Experience 
This section of the interview was used to give the reader 
some knowledge about the personnel involved in the weapons 
acquisition process. Specifically, it provides a picture of 
the array of officials that deal with the Government in terms 
of their experience and time involved in the procurement 
process. 
a. Question 1 
What is your present position and how long have you 
been in your present position? 
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b. Interpretation of Responses 
The years in present position responses can be 
grouped into three levels of experience: The first group 
contained five interviewees and ranged from 1.5 to 5 years of 
experience. The second group contained four interviewees and 
ranged from 8 to 12 years of experience. The third group 
contained two interviewees and they had 20 and 40 years of 
experience. All 11 officials are involved in program 
management either on the Government or corrrrnercial side of 
contracting for weapon systems. Each of the interviewees 
responded that they had worked in Government procurement prior 
to becoming responsible for a Warranty Program. A review of 
the warranty managers' job titles indicates that they are 
involved in the process of procuring or selling equipment with 
the Government. Job titles included: Program Manager; Acting 
Division Chief; Chief, Readiness Management Division; 
Director of Materials; Manager of Contracts; Contract 
Manager; Chief, Business Management Division; General 
Counsel, Contract Negotiator, Subcontract Administrator; 
Manager of Warranty and Maintenance Cost. 
c. Analysis 
The data indicate that these individuals are well-
qualified in terms of experience and job responsibilities to 
assess the value of a warranty for a weapon system. Four 
individuals 1n the first group were Military officers in 
Program Management. These four had the least experience in 
acquisition. Among the second and third groups five 
individuals were prior Military Officers with positions in 
acquisition management. These experience levels indicate a 
firm background in Military acquisition procedures and 
responsible leaders in their respective fields. It can be 
concluded that their opinions represent informed responses 
regarding the use of warranties in the program management 
field. 
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2. Assessment of Value to the Government 
This section covers questions 2, 3, and 4. Their intent 
1s to determine if warranties are valuable to the Government 
and commercial sector and if they add performance to the 
weapon system. 
a. Question 2 
In your opinion, are warranties applicable to 
military weapon systems? 
b. Interpretation of Responses 
Responses to this question were received from 11 
interviewees. Eighty-two percent indicated that warranties 
are applicable to military weapon systems. Eighteen percent 




responses that stated warranties were 
based on the following reasoning: by law 
warranties are applicable, however prior to 1984, DOD policy 
was not to incur the added expense of warranties. The 
warranty mandate has added costs. If properly written and 
administered, · warranties can save the Government costs of 
repairs beyond what would be expected. The trend for 
threshold warranties may selectively, and in discrete 
circumstances, make sense. 
The interviewees that indicated warranties were not 
applicable stated: Warranties are redundant to the myriad of 
regulations, specifications, and quality assurance 
requirements which a contractor is forced to accept and comply 
with in any fixed-price major system purchase. They are 
inconsistent with purchases in a cost-reimbursement 
contracting mode. Under cost-reimbursement types, warranty 
costs become allowable and allocable to the same extent as 
other costs. Thus, a warranty requirement allows the 
Government to obtain repairs on a non-fee bearing basis, but 
it still must bear the target costs and any overrun costs. 
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Finally, warranty provisions represent a potential cost that 
must be paid. 
c. Analysis 
Assessment of the applicability of warranties for 
the Military weapon systems is that warranties do in fact 
serve a purpose. Eighty-two percent of respondents indicated 
that warranties served a purpose, were applicable to Military 
weapon systems, and that the primary reason for use of a 
warranty was the legislative mandate. The applicability was 
qualified by most respondents who stated that if warranties 
were properly written and administered, they could be 
applicable. 
The original intent of the mandated warranty 
legislation was to protect the Government from shoddy 
workmanship, poor materials, and unsafe weapon systems. The 
findings do not substantiate that improved quality of 
workmanship, materials or safer weapons are derivatives of 
this mandate. The applicability is not consistent with the 
expectation of increased quality. Rather, warranties are 
being purchased primarily because of the legislative mandate. 
This is inconsistent with good business practices. Good 
business practice would indicate that there must be added 
value in the products if a higher cost is paid. Warranties 
should be purchased only if there is an economic benefit 
derived for the Government in terms of risk reduction or 1n 
acquiring quality, reliable, and safe weapon systems. 
d. Question 3 
What purpose does a warranty serve to the 
Government? 
e. Interpretation of Responses 
Responses to this question were received from 11 
interviewees. Eighty-two percent indicated that warranties 
serve a purpose for military weapon systems. Eighteen 
percent answered that warranties did not serve a purpose for 
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military weapon systems. 
The responses that indicated warranties were 
relevant to the Government acquisition stated: the major 
purpose is satisfying the statutory requirement to have a 
warranty. This was the predominant justification. 
A warranty provides a degree of protection to the 
Government. Warranties guard against incurring future costs 
for defects in materials and workmanship. More complex 
warranties can also be structured to guarantee product 
performance in the future and require that the full cost of 
redesign and hardware/software implementation to achieve the 
warranted performance be borne by the contractor. The 
II insurance II that warranties represent may or may not be worth 
the cost paid for them. The Government must analyze the 
entirety of a given contract in order to make an informed 
decision. 
A warranty provides the Government with added time 
to determine/locate specified defects in items which existed 
at acceptance. Defects can be in material, workmanship, non-
compliance with the Technical Data Package (TDP) or failure to 
meet performance as tested during the warranty period. For 
the vast majority of systems, warranties are redundant to the 
myriad of regulations, specifications, and quality assurance 
requirements that a contractor is forced to accept and comply 
with in any fixed-price major system purchase. No useful 
purpose is served to the Government. The Government should 
not have to shoulder the cost of quality defects in 
manufacturing and assembly errors. For new systems or when 
dealing with a contractor with a history of Quality Assurance 
(QA) problems, it serves as an effective control mechanism. 
This is the case especially for the infant mortality of new 
weapons. 
The purpose served is to ensure Government rights 
subsequent to final acceptance and delivery. However, the 
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inclusion of warranty provisions in production contracts, as 
opposed to development contracts, is a major error. 
Warranties used in this manner serve in such instances more as 
a "service policy" rather than to ensure enhanced design, 
product reliability, and improved quality. In addition, in 
production contracts, they are a cost to the Government 
whether or not cost-effective or required. 
"A warranty serves the Government only if it offers 
economic benefit" according to respondent number 8. The 
contractor's proposed warranty should be evaluated against 
alternative means of repair such as U.S. Government organ1c 
repair capability at intermediate and depot repair facilities 
or by contract maintenance and overhaul. 
f. Analysis 
The nine respondents who felt that warranties served 
a useful purpose to the Government all qualified their 
answers. A careful reading of those qualifications may 
properly lead one to conclude that warranties provide economic 
benefit to the Government when they are properly structured. 
Otherwise, they are at best useless, and at worst a benefit to 
the contractor. The prevalent concern is the misuse of the 
warranty intent; they are not meant to mitigate the likelihood 
of wanton contractor negligence, but rather serve as a safety 
net for all those legitimate unforeseen errors systemic to any 
multi-dimensional system. 
g. Question 4 
What purpose does a warranty serve to the commercial 
section of business? 
h. Interpretation of Responses 
This question was asked to clarify the purpose for 
commercial warranties and further, to determine if there was 
a distinct difference in the purpose for military versus 
commercial warranties. The overwhelming majority of 
interviewees indicated that consumers use warranties as a 
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measure of the quality or reliability of a product. The 
second most frequent comment was that warranties increased 
purchaser rights under the Uniform Commercial Code. Four of 
the respondents said that consumers were protected from the 
II infant mortality. II Infant mortality refers to weapon systems 
in the early stages of development before they are proven 
systems with reliability and quality standards. A distinction 
was made for the interest the Government places in warranties. 
That distinction was that the Government used warranties to 
1ncrease its rights over the contractor and above those 
provided for under the contract. 
i. Analysis 
The purpose of a warranty in the commercial sector 
was primarily to measure the quality or reliability of the 
products and to increase consumer protection under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Generally, the commercial sector has more 
faith in products that the manufacturer warrants. They are 
more willing to purchase items which are advertised with 
certain guarantees in quality, workmanship and materials. 
There is no commercial mandate for warranties, although 
consumer protection agencies have established liability for 
those manufacturers that have not provided high quality 
merchandise. 
3. Assessment of the Use of Cost-benefit Analysis as a 
Risk Management Tool 
This section includes questions 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11. 
Their intent is: (1) to draw a conclusion about the preference 
in using cost-benefit analysis as a tool, (2) to determine if 
cost-benefit analysis is used, and if it 1s performed 
thoroughly and effectively, and (3) if the expense of a cost-
benefit analysis is justified for use as a management tool to 
assess the value of a warranty. 
The technique most valued by the respondents was the 
cost-benefit analysis. This is consistent with the private 
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sector's use of management tools. Cost lS the driving force 
for commercial practices, and should be a relevant factor in 
determining if a warranty is required in Government weapon 
systems acquisition. Clearly, there are other considerations 
that must be addressed when the use of a cost-benefit analysis 
is dictated. The data used in estimating the value must be 
clearly identified. For Government practices, this includes 
the Life Cycle Cost of a given weapon system. Often these 
data are incomplete or insufficient to determine many of these 
factors. Additionally, the Government lacks adequate data 
management systems to accurately predict many of these 
elements. 
a. Question 5 
Which technique used to estimate the value of a 
warranty would you rank as the most effective, models or cost-
benefit analysis? 
b. Interpretation of Responses 
These responses varied from the structure of the 
survey. Some of the respondents indicated other answers. The 
most popular method of estimating the value of a warranty was 
cost-benefit analysis. The second most popular were both the 
cost-benefit analysis and models. A third surprising answer 
was that there were simply no good methods for collecting and 
analyzing all the variables that needed to be evaluated to 
determine the value of a warranty. 
The analysis is listed for each alternative: 
(1) Cost-benefit Analysis. A thorough cost-
benefit analysis can identify the practicality of 
administering the warranty in the DOD system. The Government 
should make pure estimates on new starts or collect actual 
field failure data for fielded systems. It should then 
compare the cost of contractor warranty repair versus organic 
repair or commercial maintenance and overhaul contracts. 
A problem of real concern is that, within the 
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Government, any savings which can be shown on paper (whether 
real or not) can make or break a program. This leads to 
concern for potential biases, because the agency responsible 
for the cost-benefit analysis is usually under the control of 
the Program Manager. 
(2) Models. Various models are used to 
forecast the expected, then a risk analysis is performed. 
These models can be effective, but are not applied uniformly 
throughout the Services. 
(3) Both. Models and cost-benefit analysis 
techniques can be employed to estimate the value of a 
warranty. However, the results of both may not bear any 
relationship to the ultimate outcome of cost incurred or 
avoided, because predicting future events or circumstances has 
obvious limitations. Clearly, this is the case for the major 
weapon systems where there are a multitude of variables at 
work at all times. 
(4) Neither. Becauseofpoordatabases, they 
never truly address the conceptual weakness of the warranty in 
a military environment. Neither adequately consider 
unmeasurable and intangible negative and positive factors 
involved in the operation of a warranty (e.g. some people let-
up on addressing quality, mistakenly thinking the warranty 
will do it for them and for the Army) . It does not apply 
uniformly. There 1s no one technique that is best to 
estimate the value of a warranty. 
c. Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis is one of the most accepted 
risk management tools used in the commercial sector. There 
are other models that agencies employ. Those models contain 
an array of information unique to their systems. The 
information that appears most frequently are life cycle costs, 
system effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness. 
It is appropriate for the Government to consider 
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developing a model that contains these elements and others 
that are unique to military systems. This model could then be 
tailored to address the specific issues required of particular 
military operations. Acceptance and approval of an analytical 
tool appears to be one of the greatest drawbacks to develop or 
to modify an existing model. Until the analysis is accepted 
as concrete evidence that a warranty is not cost-effective and 
approved throughout the chain of command, it is unlikely that 
any relative value will be placed on performing warranty 
analysis. 
d. Question 6 
Are cost-benefit analyses performed effectively? 
e. Interpretation of Responses 
At forty-six percent, a plurality of the population, 
indicated that cost-benefit analysis was not performed 
effectively. Data collection, assimilation and interpretation 
are variables that consistently vary from program to program. 
Thus, it is difficult to ensure that the data analyses are 
comprehensive. Their comments reflect that actual costs of 
warranties are difficult to ascertain. Benefits are assumed 
to be automatic, but many (if not most) claims do not meet 
warranty provisions. Most warranty determination is made by 
the manufacturer, because he has a better data base. As 
warranty money is not returned to the user, benefit is also 
hard to measure. 
They are always skewed to show a savings, often 
using unrealistic but logically sounding assumptions. "Hidden 
costs" of a modification or retrofit are difficult to account 
for. 
The evidence of so few waivers being granted 1s 
documentation that warranties are being required irrespective 
of their cost-effectiveness. Therefore, it is a waste of 
resources to perform a cost-benefit analysis. 
The next highest response rate was thirty-six 
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percent. This group suggested that the cost-benefit analysis 
is the basis for the negotiations of the cost of the warranty. 
Administration can be cumbersome 1n developing the 
quantifiable data necessary to evaluate a cost-benefit 
analysis (data collection/interpretation) . 
When the U.S. Army procured initial warranties in 
the mid-1980's, it was done on the premise that warranties 
were inherently good. In some instances, the actual 
occurrences of failure and warranty repair costs were far less 
than the annual cost of the warranty. This happened in large 
part due to the failure to implement any constructive cost-
benefit analysis, and because the contractor assumed a greater 
maintenance role than doctrine indicated. 
There were two individuals, 18 percent, that did not 
comment on the effectiveness of cost-benefit analysis. 
f. Analysis 
Are cost-benefit analyses performed effectively? 
Are they utilized to determine the necessity of a warranty for 
a weapon system? When cost-benefit analysis is performed, is 
the expense for cost-benefit analysis justified by the results 
of the analysis? 
In general, the responses indicated that cost-
benefit analyses were performed, but not effectively or 
independently to assess the value or potential value of a 
warranty. There was also a general lack of confidence in the 
data assimilated and used to make predictions. Data 
collection, assimilation and interpretation are variables that 
consistently vary from program to program; thus, it is 
difficult to ensure the data analyses are comprehensive. 
Actual costs of warranties are difficult to ascertain. This 
is especially true in a system that has numerous maintenance 
and accounting requirements. The true cost of a warranty is 
difficult to estimate with confidence. For accurate 
estimation it would be necessary to increase the current 
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information management of assets. This compounds the problem 
with an increased administrative burden to capture and report 
those data. In an already downsizing military, the current 
assets have to be optimized. Administrative functions become 
a low priority in units where combat readiness lS of 
paramount concern. Cost-benefit analyses used in combination 
with the systems assessments, and test and evaluation 
assessments should prove to provide adequate technical 
information for an assessment of the value of a warranty. 
g. Question 7 
Are cost-benefit analyses utilized to determine the 
necessity of a warranty for a weapon system? 
h. Interpretation of Responses 
Thirty-six percent indicated that cost-benefit 
analysis was utilized to determine the necessity of a warranty 
for a weapon system. Forty-six percent expressed that a cost-
benefit analysis was not used to determine the necessity of a 
warranty, because warranties are mandated by law. Eighteen 
percent had no comment on this question. 
The responses overwhelmingly indicated that the 
primary reason the cost-benefit analysis was performed was to 
meet the statute. They also indicated that the law is not 
clearly understood. The statutory requirement for a cost-
benefit analysis is tied to the program as an element of 
milestone exit criteria. The respondents that understood the 
law indicated such analysis is necessary to support warranty 
approval for ACAT I programs or to substantiate waivers. 
The necessity for a warranty is dictated by statute 
and implementing regulations, both of which appear to have 
been misconstrued 1n execution. Warranties are being 
purchased without regard to cost, value, or need. The 
deviation process and the required level of approval, as well 
as the interpretation given the regulations, are at fault. 
The current climate influencing the program manager and 
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contracting officer inhibits the thorough assessment of the 
value of a warranty. 
i. Analysis 
Cost-benefit analyses are being performed. There 
are concerns about the quality of the data being evaluated and 
the conclusions. The results show that cost-benefit analyses 
are not being used to determine the necessity of a warranty 
for a weapon system. The data analyses performed must use 
complete and consistent data that represent the system and 
must identify any un1que characteristics. If these elements 
are provided, the level of confidence in the analysis should 
support the decision. 
The decision should be supported once the program 
manager and contracting officer evaluate the cost-benefit 
analysis. Political implications, combined with the stringent 
mandates, dictate that the program manager take a proactive 
position in the analysis to determine the most reasonable 
approach and the practicality of a warranty. Political 
influence must be dealt with to ensure that the analysis is 
the factor that determines whether a warranty should be 
purchased. The analysis must provide a convincing basis to 
support the decision of whether or not to purchase a warranty. 
j. Question 10 
In your opinion, are thorough cost-benefit analyses 
performed to evaluate if a warranty is cost-effective? 
k. Interpretation of Responses 
Thirty six percent responded that thorough cost-
benefit analyses were performed to evaluate if a warranty is 
cost-effective. Forty-five percent indicated that thorough 
cost-benefit analyses were not performed to determine if the 
funds expended for warranties were cost-effective. Eighteen 
percent were not sure if thorough cost-benefit analyses were 
performed. 
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The indications were that the cost-benefit analyses 
that are performed are done by another Command as part of an 
overall Milestone decision process. They are not done 
specifically for warranties. Thorough cost-benefit analyses 
must reflect "real world" environments. Those are difficult 
to replicate during the weapon system acquisition process. 
When the Government requests contractors to develop 
proposals for weapon system warranties the thoroughness of the 
cost-benefit analysis is the key factor in deciding upon 
warranty provisions. The Congressional and Department of 
Defense oversight for the requirements process, including 
funding, may require a warranty provision no matter what the 
cost-benefit analysis may show. Commands that perform the 
acquisition function usually find it difficult or politically 
unwise to suggest that a warranty is not worth the projected 
cost. The cost-benefit analysis assumptions may be complex, 
and even unknowingly biased about future occurrences, however 
it remains the preferred tool. Once the decision has been 
made not to get a waiver, all other considerations are only 
paperwork exercises. 
1. Analysis 
The cost-benefit analyses that are being performed 
are not supporting requests for waivers. The thoroughness of 
cost-benefit analysis is suspect when its results are not used 
to support decisions. The indications are that the data are 
either inconclusive or incomplete otherwise they would be used 
to justify the use of waivers. If this is the case, then a 
carefully established method should be developed to identify 
the parameters that most reflect actual data. Models should 
be scrutinized to select the one most appropriate for any 
given weapon system. The data should then be gathered, 
analyzed, and reported to assist the program manager in making 
the best decision regarding a warranty. 
Implementation instructions for cost-benefit 
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analysis should be written to clearly identify appropriate 
procedures. Pending the results of clear instructions, it 
will continue to be difficult to assess if the appropriate 
data have been gathered, evaluated, and reported for decision 
making. 
m. Question 11 
In your opinion, is the expense for cost-benefit 
analysis justified by the results of the analysis? 
n. Interpretations of Responses 
Fifty-five percent indicated that the expense for a 
cost-benefit analysis is justified by the results. Thirty-six 
percent felt that the expense for a cost-benefit analysis was 
pointless. Nine percent had no comment on this question. 
These responses were mixed but focused on data 
sources and reliability. If the Government contemplates a 
warranty that will guarantee performance in the future (as 
opposed to a simple defects and workmanship warranty) , then a 
cost-benefit analysis can serve as a legitimate basis for 
identifying the value of the approach and alternatives that 
might be more cost-effective. 
Over the life cycle of a major system or component, 
there is a substantial recurring operation and support cost 
life cycle saving potential, which will justify such analysis. 
This is where problems occur. When the results are based on 
soft data, it is difficult to prove the assumptions. Since 
the cost of a warranty would far exceed that of a cost-benefit 
analysis, it does not seem prudent to purchase a warranty that 
might prove to be ineffective. 
Many respondents thought that if the Congress 
includes specific language that requires a warranty provision 
for a new complex weapon system, then it is usually pointless 
to develop a cost-benefit analysis that examines the issue. 
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o. Analysis 
If the data present meaningful information for the 
program manager to make a decision then , the expense of 
performing a cost-benefit analysis lS justified. If the 
analysis is not conclusive, then the program manager must find 
other data to evaluate. The objectives of the cost-benefit 
analysis must be clearly defined in order to determine the 
appropriate information relevant to the decision. A generic 
cost-benefit analysis will not assess the value of a warranty 
if the key factors for the equipment and its intended uses are 
not clearly identified ln the analysis. 
4. Assessment of the Value of a Warranty Waiver 
This section assesses the value of a warranty waiver. 
What is the frequency of waivers requested; the difficulty in 
obtaining a walver; the number of waivers requested, 
evaluated, and granted; and if a cost-benefit analysis is 
effective ln attaining a waiver. 
a. Question 8 
In your opinion, is the cost of a warranty regularly 
evaluated before it is purchased? 
b. Interpretation of Responses 
Sixty-four percent responded that there is no data 
evaluation to determine if a warranty would be a wise 
decision. Twenty-seven percent indicated that warranties were 
regularly evaluated before they are purchased. Nine percent 
had no comment on this question. 
The basis for these responses are that there are 
limits to the effectiveness of a warranty evaluation. This lS 
especially true with commercial components, because there lS 
a built-in warranty cost which manufacturers refuse to 
disclose. Regardless of what the procurlng contracting 
officer or Program Manager promlses, they expect to be 
provided warranty service during the course of the program. 
Therefore, they will not eliminate commercial warranty 
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markups. It is part of the negotiations. 
There is much confusion over what constitutes an 
effective evaluation. The statutes require warranties. 
Purchasing a warranty is usually just assumed to be more 
valuable. For complex weapon systems, warranty provisions 
tend to be discussed and analyzed before being solicited from 
a contractor. Often, contracts are negotiated for products 
and contract costs which have warranty costs embedded. The 
cost of a warranty (i.e. real cost) is an "after the fact" 
consideration. 
c. Analysis 
This question was designed to illustrate the degree 
to which the program manager is influenced by a cost-benefit 
analysis when warranties are a factor in the procurement. 
Information presented, illustrate that warranties are not 
regularly evaluated to determine the cost-benefit 
relationship. This is confirmed by the lack of waivers 
granted; therefore, it can be presumed that the focus 1s on 
fulfilling the mandate rather than evaluating the need for a 
warranty. A cost-benefit analysis is an additional burden (in 
terms of manhour cost) to the program manager, if he cannot 
influence a waiver decision based on the findings. Rarely, 
are waivers granted based on a cost-benefit analysis; so 
rather than invest time and effort in them, a program manager 
will concur with the mandate. This was not the intent of the 
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legislation. The intent was for the program to be scrutinized 
for the most effective and efficient use of Government funds. 
d. Question 9 
In your opinion, are wa1vers sought based on the 
results of the evaluation? 
e. Interpretation of Responses 
Fifty-five percent did not believe that warranty 
waivers were requested on the basis of evaluation. Thirty-six 




Nine percent did not respond to this 
There is a lack of understanding in what makes up a 
sound cost-benefit analysis; therefore, waivers are not 
sought. The general impression is that waivers will not be 
approved, so why bother with an evaluation? Once warranty 
provisions are solicited from a contractor, they are rarely 
changed. Waivers are rarely approved. The decision to 
request a waiver is strictly political. 
f. Analysis 
Waivers are rarely sought. There are two 
explanations for this: The data revealed that they were not 
cost-effective. There is a genuine concern about the quality 
of the analysis. Even if a cost-benefit analysis conclusively 
shows that the warranty is not cost-effective, the waiver is 
unlikely to be approved. The indications are that the system 
~s so cumbersome for waiver approvals that it is not 
responsive to the program manager. The level at which the 
approval must be granted operates in a different environment 
than that of the Military hierarchy. This is because the 
Secretary of Defense may grant a waiver. He is held to the 
extremely high constraint of having to prepare and forward 
complete information about the waiver he has approve to the 
Appropriations and the Authorization Committees. This does 
not empower the Secretary of Defense to make a decision that 
he can enforce. The system was designed to have checks and 
balances; however, it is questionable as to what level is 
most appropriate for waiver approvals. If a waiver is granted 
by the Secretary of Defense, it is still an open action until 
approved by the Appropriation and Authorization Committees. 
This is clearly a disincentive for approval of a warranty 
waiver. 
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g. Question 12 
In your opinion, is it difficult to get a waiver 
approved? 
b. Interpretation of Responses 
Sixty-four percent indicated that getting a waiver 
was difficult. Eighteen percent indicated it was not 
difficult and 18 percent had no comment. 
It appears from the comments that most of the 
respondents think it is almost impossible to get a waiver 
approved. 
The problem within some communities is not 
necessarily getting a waiver approved, but getting approval 
from management to request a waiver. This is another 
political statement about how receptive the Command would be 
in pursuing an analysis and warranty waiver. This task would 
be more manageable if a cost-benefit analysis or model was 
based on sound conclusive data. 
It would be very interesting to see the evaluation 
and justification for pursuing a warranty from the 
Government's files. It should be a risk-management and cost-
benefit analysis that predicts the value or benefit to be 
gained by the Government. The current statute demands another 
box be II checked-off 11 under their procurement requirements, 
rather than demanding realistic carefully scrutinized 
decisions by those members of the procurement process that are 
trained and paid to make these decisions. 
i. Analysis 
The assumption is that sound conclusive data 
indicates that a warranty would not be cost-effective. 
Highlighted among the responses were political statements 
about how receptive the Command would be in pursuing an 
analysis and warranty waiver. In most cases, the efforts for 
attaining warranty waivers were not considered to be a 
possible alternative. The respondents think it is politically 
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impossible to get a warranty waiver approved. The difficulty 
should only be in working through the stringent process. If 
a Command believes in its product, there should be no mandate 
for a warranty. The statute was intended to ensure quality 
material, workmanship, and safe weapons for military 
personnel. A warranty it should be evaluated to determine if 
a waiver is appropriate. The issues should not rest on the 
mandate. If it does not make good business sense to pursue a 
warranty a waiver should be requested. 
j. Question 13 
In your opinion, about how many waivers have you 
seen requested, evaluated, and granted? 
k. Inter.pretation of Responses 
The responses to this question were surprising. 
Forty-five percent have never seen any warranty waivers 
requested, evaluated or granted. Twenty-seven percent have 
seen ten waivers requested, and evaluated, but none granted. 
Twenty-seven percent did not have knowledge of any warranty 
waivers. 
With the number of years of experience represented 
by the interviewees in this study, it seems unusual to have so 
few requests for waivers. It seems clear from this study 
that Congress or the reviewing political officials will not 
grant a warranty waiver. This is so even when warranties are 
shown to be costly and ineffective. Granting exemption means 
going against the law and accepting the risk of criticism. It 
appears the Congress mistakenly views waivers as a means to 
ensure quality. 
l. Analysis 
This question was designed to determine the volume 
of walvers that had been requested, evaluated, and granted. 
When the statute was passed ln 1985, the majority of 
respondents were either in their current job or affiliated 
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with weapon system procurement. It would seem reasonable that 
upon introduction of a new statute, program managers would 
identify programs that they felt would not benefit from a 
warranty. Those programs would then be subjected to a cost-
benefit analysis to attain a waiver. Even more surprisingly, 
is that from this entire group only ten warranty waivers had 
been requested and evaluated, and none were granted. It 
appears that since the trend has been for waivers not to be 
approved, program managers have focused their effort in areas 
where pay-offs are reasonably anticipated. For whatever 
reasons, it is clear that program managers are rarely 
requesting waivers. 
m. Question 14 
In your opinion, how often are thorough cost-benefit 
analyses performed to evaluate if a warranty was in fact cost-
effective? 
n. Interpretation of Responses 
Forty-five percent responded that cost-benefit 
analyses are seldom done to determine if a warranty was cost-
effective. Thirty-six percent said they did not know if this 
was done. Eighteen percent indicated that cost-benefit 
analyses are performed often to evaluate if a warranty was 
cost-effective. 
The data indicates that in the contracting arena it 
lS done to evaluate if a warranty was cost-effective, and that 
in the weapon systems procurement side, cost-benefit analyses 
were done based on statutes. This comment is relevant to the 
cost-benefit analyses required by milestone exit criteria. 
o. Analysis 
It is apparent that cost-benefit analyses are being 
performed by program managers before the contracts are signed. 
The cost-benefit analyses that are done in conjunction with 
the program decision reviews rather than to determine the 
potential effectiveness of a warranty. There is no record of 
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a cost-benefit analysis that is being performed specifically 
to evaluate if a warranty provision in a contract was cost-
effective. In addition, the administration requirements 
associated with the assessment of warranties are often cost-
prohibitive. The Government's information systems do not 
record every claim processed or action taken. This would be 
necessary to accurately estimate the benefit or value the 
Government received on a warranty. 
5. Assessment of a Correlation of Warranty and Quality 
This section involves only one question. The question is 
intended to determine if the populace interviewed believed 
that warranties were a tool to improve the quality of a weapon 
system. a. Question 15 
Would you recommend meeting the intent of 
legislation of improved quality through a warranty? 
b. Inte~retation of Responses 
Fifty-five percent responded that warranties and 
quality should not to be correlated as symbiotic. Forty-five 
percent believed that quality was improved by the use of 
warranties. 
For complex weapon systems, the Government should 
focus on requirements that cost-effectively cause contractors 
to design high reliability into their products at the onset of 
a program. Designing elaborate warranty provisions misses the 
mark by focusing on the future rather than the present. 
Spending today's dollars to require the use of high 
reliability parts and components, infant mortality tests 
screening, and statistical process controls, is more effective 
than a warranty. Additionally, the Government can monitor 
over time the effectiveness that these requirements have on 
the system reliability. A warranty is a "tool" to apply when 
appropriate. Reliability improvement warranties can be used 
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in development contracts, and be provided for as "options" 
that are priced and exercised unilaterally by the Government 
subsequent to deli very, and which are related to discrete 
aspects of performance for discrete functions (at the 
subsystem or replaceable unit level) . A warranty is a 
reasonable way to ensure good Quality Assurance of performance 
on a new start system; however, once a system has been fielded 
and established a good track record, waivers should be sought. 
Quality is improved by process control, and Total 
Quality Management (TQM), not by warranty legislation. 
Quality lS enhanced by component and end item testing to 
isolate deficiencies and improving the design and production 
processes, with contract provisions and incentives. You get 
quality by doing it right. Warranties do not ensure quality. 
Warranties will not be sold by any military or commercial 
contractor unless it yields an acceptable profit. In the 
context of purchasing a commercial product, a warranty may 
have some marginal impact on quality, because the contractor 
has total control of the design and the markets he targets. 
He has an incentive to get it right or he will not be in 
business long. Warranties are a repair vehicle, not a 
Quality Assurance enforcement tool or a viable tool to cause 
redesign, unless it is part of a lot failure under a system 
type warranty. 
The military does not have an effective system to 
administer and take advantage of the warranties on its 
equipment. There is no incentive at the user level to track 
warranties. Warranties, with limitations, often expire before 
a piece of equipment is received by a unit due to the time 
spent in depot storage. 
Warranties have their place ln the acquisition 
process, but they must be viewed critically from the 




The intent of Congress was to ensure that the 
Government purchased weapon systems that were safe, and made 
from good materials with quality workmanship. The concern for 
poor workmanship and materials developed in the late 1970's 
and early 1980's as referenced in chapter II. There is no 
doubt that the quality of weapon systems is consistently being 
measured. This is being accomplished by a number of methods. 
These methods begin in concept exploration and extend through 
Production. There are a number of Milestone decisions that 
must be evaluated. Each of these decisions use cost, 
schedule, and performance criteria to evaluate if the weapon 
system meets its requirements as stated in the Mission Needs 
Statement and the Operational Requirements Document. A 
number of tests and evaluations are performed during 
developmental and operational testing that would identify 
inferior workmanship, material, or design defects. Once a 
weapon system has reached the production phase, the majority 
of defects will have been resolved to the program manager's 
satisfaction. It appears to be prudent to permit the program 
manager to perform the risk management decision on purchasing 
warranties. If he has performed an analysis to determine the 
cost-effectiveness of a warranty, it should be within his 
scope of authority to approve that decision. The legislative 
mandate is too restrictive in nature, and it imposes 
restrictions that it were intended to avoid - the payment for 
goods or services inconsistent with good business practices. 
B. SUMMARY 
This chapter has demonstrated through data analysis that 
assessment of the value of major weapon systems warranties are 
not being pursued. It is mandated by Federal statutes that 
all ma]or weapon systems above a certain cost and production 
threshold have a warranty, unless the cost-benefit analysis 
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shows that the warranty is not cost-effective and is approved 
by the appropriate official (the lowest approval level for the 
military departments is the Secretary of the Department with 
authority to re-delegate to no lower than an Assistant 
Secretary) The number of waivers requested is surprisingly 
small. This is because of the statutory warranty requirement, 
politically sensitive nature of costly Government contracts, 
and the requirement that they be approved at such a high 
level. The intent of the statute is that warranties insure a 
quality product at a reasonable cost to the Government. The 
required cost-benefit analysis and waiver request are meant to 
be additional safeguards against Government waste. In this 
regard, the fiduciary duty of the program manager is clear; 
unfortunately, otherwise prudent managers are not making use 
of waivers as a legitimate cost cutting tool, because the 
requirements for obtaining waivers are too restrictive, and 
the cost-benefit analysis that justify them are not 
standardized. There is no standard for measuring the value of 
a warranty. The Congressional intent of the warranty statute 
has been exceeded. Program managers are not empowered to make 
viable decisions based upon their best judgment without undue 
consideration of restrictive regulations and perceived 
political constraints. As an adjunct to this, reliable and 
standardized cost models have not been fully developed. An 
overall standard has not been approved for acquisition 
programs and the authorization for waiver approval level is 
intimidating at best. This chapter has demonstrated, through 
data analysis, that the current warranty legislation is too 
restrictive for prudent use. It unnecessarily imposes an 
excessive influence over a program manager's ability to 
fulfill his fiduciary responsibilities. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter will make statements of conclusion to the 
Thesis Primary and Subsidiary questions. It will also provide 
recommendations and areas for further research. The 
researcher will base her conclusions and recommendations on 
her literature review, interviews conducted, and interview 
analysis results. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Subsidiary Question #1. How are warranties 
as compared to applicable to military weapon systems 
commercial warranties? 
Warranties, whether for military weapon systems or 
commercial items, should provide economic benefit. They serve 
as a safety net for all those legitimate unforeseen errors 
systemic to any multi-dimensional system. Warranties, while 
protecting the consumer, place liability on the manufacturer 
to produce goods that are not inferior in quality or 
workmanship. 
The distinct disadvantage for Military weapon systems 
warranties is that they are difficult to administer and the 
organization responsible for the equipment is not directly 
reimbursed for the faulty item in most cases. In contrast, 





Subsidiary Question #2. 
the value of a warranty 
optimal tools used for 
How does one identify and 
to the Government? 
assessment of the value of 
warranties are through cost-benefit analyses and models. 
Cost-benefit analysis is the most preferred method. There are 
problems associated with any method selected. These problems 
are that the variables for an in-depth assessment vary with 
each weapon system. The variability and maturity of the data 
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selected and used may affect the evaluations and conclusions 
about its value. 
There is a great deal of concern about the thoroughness 
and effectiveness of the cost-benefit analysis. The 
respondents had concerns about the variability of data 
required and the independence of the agency performing the 
analysis. Concern is expressed that warranties are being 
purchased based on the statutory mandate without regard to the 
cost, value, or need of the warranty. 
3. Subsidiary Question #3. To what extent are program 
managers able to request and justify waiving the legislative 
mandate for warranty inclusion? 
The requirements to request and justify waiving the 
legislative statute are clear. A cost-benefit analysis must 
be performed to determine the value of the warranty. This 
should include benefits of warranty versus cost to the 
Government to administer and enforce the warranty, cost for 
correction or replacement in absence of warranty, and cost to 
keep warranties in effect. 
The process for waivers is attainable but difficult. The 
requirement for Congressional notification and level of waiver 
authority stifle attempts to waive the warranty where it would 
not be cost-effective. (Streamlining Defense Acquisition 
Laws, 1993, p. 2-116) There is a reluctance to issue warranty 
walvers. This may result in the purchase of warranties 
without regard to their cost-effectiveness. (Streamlining 
Defense Acquisition Laws, 1993, p. 2-116) 
4. To what extent do warranties impact product quality 
in design manufacturing, materials and workmanship, and 
performance specifications? 
The impact of warranties on product quality ln design 
manufacturing, materials, workmanship, and performance 
specifications are less significant than the numerous 
evaluations and tests that the weapon system must pass. Once 
a weapon system has reached the production phase, it has been 
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thoroughly scrutinized to ensure conformance with 
specifications, requirements, design criteria, and testing and 
evaluation to name a few. At each milestone decision, 
programs are thoroughly assessed to ensure that the critical 
performance requirements are attained in order to continue to 
the next acquisition level. The level and number of 
requirements impact far more on the product quality than the 
warranty requirement. 
5. Primary Research Question. To what extent is the 
warranty legislation expected to be effective in providing 
relief for the real-world problems which program managers must 
overcome to successfully structure, implement, and administer 
warranties? 
The warranty legislation exceeds the purpose for which it 
was drafted. 
The solution to the acquisition problems of the 
past has been too simply promulgate regulations 
insisting that whatever problem has occurred never 
ever occur again. The resulting body of 
procurement "law" has therefore been evolutionary-
rather than the product of a carefully 
considered, effort to determine how best to manage 
military procurement. (Cleland, Gallagher and 
Whitehead, 1993, p. 1.9) 
Project managers are not empowered to fully perform their 
fiduciary responsibility. In this complex political 
environment, the system of checks and balances is proving 
costly when we educate, train, and place responsibility for 
performance with the program manager but neglect to allow him 
flexibility to perform his duties free of obtrusive 
restrictions. The objective should be for him to justify why 
a warranty is necessary and cost-effective; his justification 
and subsequent recommendations should serve as the primary 
basis for the warranty decision. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Performance of a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
if a warranty is justified for the weapon system. 
The objective should be for the program manager to 
justify if a warranty is necessary and cost-effective. A 
cost-benefit analysis must be independently supervised, 
include a standardized model, and justify a warranty before 
the Request for Proposal (RFP) is released for the production 
contract. 
2. Implementation instructions to specify under what 
conditions warranty waivers will be considered for approval. 
The program manager must have a degree of confidence that 
his cost-benefit analysis lS complete, and that it 
conclusively shows that the value of the warranty is not cost-
effective. Once this lS finalized, it should be clearly 
discernable as to the appropriate criteria that must be met to 
proceed with a request for a warranty waiver. 
3. Reevaluation of the appropriate level for approval of 
warranty waivers. 
The Assistant Secretary for the Service for Military 
Departments is the first individual in the chain of command 
authorized to grant a warranty waiver. This approval level 
may be to difficult to obtain with the contracting time 
constraints. The waiver must be approved before the actual 
contract is signed. It may be more appropriate to initiate 
the request for a waiver at the time that the Request for 
Proposal is released. 
4. Standardization of a cost-benefit model to determine 
the value of a warranty that could be tailored to a specific 
weapon system. 
There are a number of cost analysis models that could be 
adapted. The problem lies in the determination of which model 
is most appropriate for a given system. Perhaps a system 
similar to that used for software development could be 
developed and adapted for the specific program. 
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. A standardized model or systemized approach to 
evaluate the value of a warranty. 
A comprehensive study is necessary to evaluate and 
standardize parameters that will indicate the value of a 
warranty. A systemic approach will ensure that the evaluation 
1s thorough and is reflective of the true value of the 
warranty. 
2. Develop training programs on warranties for 
Government weapon systems. 
The Government is in need of a standardized process that 
enables key personnel to evaluate the adequacy of cost-
benefit analyses. The most appropriate method is to establish 
a training program that is comprehensive, and covers the 
approved models and cost-benefit analyses being used by the 
Government. 
The Government has numerous computerized systems to 
capture data on weapon systems. Appropriate tools to track, 
quantify and qualify the value of warranties must be included. 
Optimizing of training opportunities may be the key to assist 




APPENDIX A. WARRANTY LAW 
A. CURRENT WARRANTY LAW 
This appendix is a complete citation of the current 
warranty in effect. This law originated in the 1984 Congress 
and was enacted as law in the 1985 Appropriations Bill. 
Included in this section are each of the three supplements as 
they pertain to warranty law. 
B. UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 10, SECTION 2403, 1988. MAJOR 
WEAPON SYSTEMS: CONTRACTOR GUARANTEES 
1. United States Code, Major Weapon Systems: Contractor 
Guarantees 
(a) In this section: 
(1) the term "Weapon system" means items that can be used 
directly by the armed forces to carry out combat missions and 
that cost more than $100 thousand or for which the eventual 
total procurement cost is more than $10, million. such term 
does not include commercial items sold ln substantial 
quantities to the general public. 
(2) the term "prime contractor" means a party that enters 
into an agreement directly with the United States to furnish 
part or all of a weapon system. 
( 3) the term "design and manufacturing requirements' 
means structural and engineering plans and manufacturing 
particulars, including precise measurements, tolerances, 
materials, and finished product tests for the weapon system 
being produced. 
(4) The term "essential performance requirements", with 
respect to a weapon system, means the operating capabilities 
or maintenance and reliability characteristics of the system 
that are determined by the Secretary of Defense to be 
necessary for the system to fulfill the military requirement 
for which the system is designed. 
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(5) The term "component" means any constituent element 
of a weapon system. 
( 6) the term "mature full-scale production" means the 
manufacture of all units of a weapon system after the 
manufacture of the first one-tenth of the eventual total 
production or the initial production quantity of such system, 
whichever is less. 
(7) The term "initial production quantity" means the 
number of units of a weapon system contracted_for in the first 
year of full-scale production. 
(8) The term "head of an agency" has the meanlng given 
that term in section 2302 of this title. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the head of 
an agency may not after January 1, 1985, enter into a contract 
for the production of a weapon system unless each prime 
contractor for the system provides the United States with 
written guarantees That--
(1) The time provided under the contract will conform to 
the design and manufacturing requirements specifically 
delineated in the production contract (or in any amendment to 
that contract); 
(2) the item provided under the contract, at the time 
it is delivered to the United States, will be free from all 
defects in materials and workmanship; 
(3) the item provided under the contract will conform to 
the essential performance requirements of the item as 
specifically delineated in the production contract (or in any 
amendment to that contract); and 
(4) if the item provided under the contract fails to meet 
the guarantee specified in clause ( 1) , ( 2) , or ( 3) , .the 
contractor will at the election of the Secretary of Defense or 
as otherwise provided in the contract--
(A) promptly take such corrective action as may be 
necessary to correct the failure at not additional cost to the 
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United States; or 
(B) pay costs reasonably incurred by the United 
States in taking such corrective action. 
(c) The head of the agency concerned may not require 
guarantees under subsection (b) from a prime contractor for a 
weapon system, for a component of a weapon system, that is 
furnished by the United States to the contractor. 
(d) Subject to subsection (e) (1), the Secretary of Defense 
may waive part or all of subsection (b) in the case of a 
weapon system, or component of a weapon system, if the 
Secretary determines--
( 1) that the waiver 1s necessary in the interest of 
national defense; or 
(2) that a guarantee under that subsection would not be 
cost-effective. The Secretary may not delegate authority 
under this subsection to any person who holds a position below 
the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or Assistance 
Secretary of a military department. 
(e) (1) Before making a waiver under subsection (d) with 
respect to a weapon system that is a major defense acquisition 
program for the purpose of section 2432 of this title, the 
Secretary of Defense shall notify the Conunittees on Armed 
Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives in writing of his intention to waive any or 
all of the requirements of subsection (b) with respect to that 
system and shall include in the notice an explanation of the 
reasons for the waiver. 
(2) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to the conunittees specified in 
paragraph ( 1) a report identifying each waiver made under 
subsection (d) during the preceding calendar year for a weapon 
system that is not a major defense acquisition program for the 
purpose of section 2432 of this title and shall include in the 
report an explanation of the reasons for the waivers. 
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(f) The requirement for a guarantee under subsection (b) (3) 
applies only in the case of a contract for a weapon system 
that lS in maturer full-scale production. However, nothing in 
this section prohibits the head of the agency concerned from 
negotiating a guarantee similar to the guarantee described in 
that subsection for a weapon system not yet in mature full-
scale production. When a contract for a weapon system not yet 
in mature full-scale production is not to include the full 
guarantee described in subsection (b) (3), the Secretary shall 
comply with the notice requirements of subsection (e). 
(g) Nothing in this section prohibits the head of the agency 
concerned from--
( 1) negotiating the specific details of a guarantee, 
including reasonable exclusions, limitations and time 
duration, so long as the negotiations and time duration, so 
long as the negotiated guarantee is consistent with the 
general requirements of this section; 
(2) requiring that components of a weapon system 
furnished by the United States to a contractor be properly 
installed so as not to invalidate any warranty or guarantee 
provided by the manufacturer of such component to the United 
states; 
( 3) reducing the price of any contract for a weapon 
system or other defense equipment to take account of any 
payment due from a contractor pursuant to subclause (B) of 
subsection (b) (4); 
(4) in the case of a dual source procurement, exempting 
from the requirements of subsection (b) (3) an amount of 
production by the second source contractor equivalent to the 
first one-tenth of the eventual total production by the second 
source contractor; and 
(5) using written guarantees to a greater extent than 
required by this section, including guarantees that exceed 
those in clauses ( 1) , ( 2) , and ( 3) of subsection (b) and 
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guarantees that provide more comprehensive remedies than the 
remedies specified under clause (4) of that subsection. 
(h) (1) the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section. 
(2) This section does not apply to the Coast Guard or to 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
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APPENDIX B. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
A. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 46 with each 
subpart is provided in its entirety for the readers reference 
to specific regulatory issues regarding warranties. Key 
factors in Government Procurement are reviewed with the basic 
document for a clear understanding of the intent of the 
regulation. 
B. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
1. The Federal Acquisition Regulation part 46, subpart 
46.702 General 
(a) The principal purposes of a warranty in a 
government contract are 
(1) to delineate the rights and obligations of 
the contractor and the Government for defective items and 
services and 
(2) to foster quality performance. 
(b) Generally, a warranty should provide--
(1) A contractual right for the correction of 
defects notwithstanding any other requirement of the contract 
pertaining to acceptance of the supplies or services by the 
Government; and 
(2) A stated period of time or use, or the 
occurrence of a specified event, after acceptance by the 
Government to assert a contractual right for the correction of 
defects. 
(3) The benefits to be derived from a warranty 
must be commensurate with the cost of the warranty to the 
Government. 
2. The Federal Acquisition Regulation part 46, subpart 
46.703 Criteria for use of Warranties 
The use of warranties is not mandatory. In determining 
65 
whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, 
the contracting officer shall consider the following factors: 
(a) Nature and use of supplies or services. This 
includes such factors as--
acceptance; and 
(1) Complexity and function; 
(2) Degree of development; 
(3) State of the art; 
(4) End use; 
( 5) Difficulty in detecting defects before 
(6} Potential harm to the government if the 
item is defective. 
(b) Cost. Warranty costs arise from--
(1) The contractor's charge for accepting the 
deferred liability created by the warranty; and 
(2) Government administration and enforcement 
of the warranty (see paragraph (c) below). 
(c) Administration and enforcement. The 
Government's ability to enforce the warranty is essential to 
the effectiveness of any warranty. There must be some 
assurance that an adequate administrative system for reporting 
defects exists or can be established. The adequacy of a 
reporting system may depend upon such factors as the--
(1) Nature and complexity of the item; 
(2) Location and proposed use of the item; 
(3) Storage time for the item; 
(4) Distance of the using activity from the 
source of the item; 
( 5) Difficulty 1n establishing existence of 
defects; and 
(6) Difficulty in tracing responsibility for 
defects. 
(d) Trade practice. In may instances an item is 
customarily warranted in the trade, and as a result of that 
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practice, the cost of an item to the Government will be the 
same whether or not a warranty 1s included. In those 
instances, it would be in the Government's interest to include 
such a warranty. 
(e) Reduced requirements. The contractor's charge 
for assumption of added liability may be partially or 
completely offset by reducing the Government's contract 
quality assurance requirements when the warranty provides 
adequate assurance of a satisfactory product. 
(3) Authority for use of Warranties 
The use of a warranty in an acquisition shall be approved 
in accordance with agency procedures. 
(4) Limitations 
(a) Except for the warranties in the clauses at 
52.246-3, Inspection of Supplies -- Cost-Reimbursement, and 
52.246-8, Inspection of Research and Development-- Cost-
reimbursement, the contracting officer shall not include 
warranties in cost-reimbursement contracts, unless authorized 
in accordance with agency regulations (see 46.708). 
(b) Warranty clauses shall not limit the 
Government's rights under an inspection clause (see Subpart 
46.3) in relation to latent defects, fraud, or gross mistakes 
that amount to fraud. 
(c) Except for warranty clauses in construction 
contracts, warranty clauses shall provide that the warranty 
applies notwithstanding inspection and acceptance or other 
clauses or terms of the contract. 
(5) Warranty Terms and Conditions 
(a) To facilitate the pricing and enforcement of 
warranties, the contracting officer shall ensure that 
warranties clearly state the--
(1) Exact nature of the item and its 
components and characteristics that the contractor warrants; 
(2) Extent of the contractors warranty 
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including all of the contractor's obligations to the 
Government for breach of warranty; 
(3) Specific remedies available to the 
Government; and 
(4) Scope and duration of the warranty. 
(b) The contracting officer shall consider the 
following guidelines when preparing warranty terms and 
conditions: 
(1) Extent of contractor obligations 
(i) Generally, the contractor's 
obligations under warranties extend to all defects discovered 
during the warranty period, but do no include damage caused by 
the Government. When a warranty for the entire item is not 
advisable, a warranty may be required for a particular aspect 
of the item that may require special protection (e.g., 
installation, components, accessories, subassemblies, 
preservation, packaging, and packing, etc.). 
(ii) If the Government specifies the 
design of the end item and its measurements, tolerances, 
materials, tests or inspection requirements, the contractor's 
obligations for correction of defects shall usually be limited 
to defects in material and workmanship or failure to conform 
to specifications. If the Government does not specify the 
design, the warranty extends also to the usefulness of the 
design. 
(iii) If express warranties are included 
in a contract (except contracts for commercial items), all 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose shall be negated by the use of specific 
language in the clause (see clauses 52.246-17, Warranty of 
Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature; and 52.246-19, Warrant of 
Systems and Equipment under Performance Specifications or 
Design Criteria) . 
(2) Remedies 
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(i) Normally, a warranty shall provide as 
a minimum that the Government may 
(A) obtain an equitable adjustment of 
the contract, or 
(B) direct the contractor to repair 
or replace the defective items as the contractor's expense. 
(ii) If it is not practical to direct the 
contractor to make the repair or replacement, or, because of 
the nature of the item, the repair or replacement does not 
afford an appropriate remedy to the Government, the warranty 
should provide alternate remedies, such as authorizing the 
Government to--
(A) retain the defective item and 
reduce the contract price by an amount equitable under the 
circumstances; or 
(B) arrange for the repair or 
replacement of the defective item, by the Government or by 
another source, at the contractor's expense. 
(iii) If it can be foreseen that it will 
not be practical to return an item to the contractor for 
repair, to remove it to an alternate source for repair, or to 
replace the defective item, the warranty should provide that 
the Government may repair, or requlre the contractor to 
repair, the item in place at the contractor's expense. The 
contract shall provide that the circumstance where the 
Government is to accomplish the repair, the contractor will 
furnish at the place of delivery the material or parts, and 
the installation instructions required to successfully 
accomplish the repalr. 
(vi) Unless provided otherwise ln the 
warranty, the contractor's obligation to repair or replace the 
defective item, or to agree to an equitable adjustment of the 
contract, shall include responsibility for the costs of 
furnishing all labor and material to 
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(A) reinspect items that the 
Government reasonably expected to be defective, 
(B) accomplish the required repair 
or replacement of defective items, and 
(C) test, inspect, package, pack, 
and mark repaired or replaced items. 
(v) If repair or replacement of defective 
items is required, the contractor shall generally be required 
by the warranty to bear the expense of transportation for 
returning the defective item from the place of delivery 
specified in the contract (irrespective of the f.o.b. point or 
the point of acceptance) to the contractor's plant and 
subsequent return. When defective items are returned to the 
contractor from other than the place of delivery specified in 
the contract, or when the Government exercises alternate 
remedies, the contractor's liability for transportation 
charges incurred shall not exceed an amount equal to the cost 
of transportation by the usual commercial method of shipment 
between the place of delivery specified in the contract and 
the contractor's plant and subsequent return. 
(3) Duration of the warranty. The time period 
or duration of the warranty must be clearly specified and 
shall be established after consideration of such factors as 
( i) the estimated useful life of the 
item, 
(ii) the nature of the item including 
storage or shelflife, and 
(iii) trade practice. The period 
specified shall not extend the contractor's liability for 
patent defects beyond a reasonable time after acceptance by 
the Government. 
( 4) Notice. The warranty shall specify a 
reasonable time for furnishing notice to the contractor 
regarding the discovery of defects. this notice period, which 
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shall apply to all defects discovered during the warranty 
period, shall be long enough to assure that the government has 
adequate time to g1ve notice to the contractor. The 
contracting officer shall consider the following factors when 
establishing the notice period: 
( i) the time necessary for the Government 
to discover the defects. 
( ii) The time reasonably required for the 
Government to take necessary administrative steps and make a 
timely report of discovery of the defects to the contractor. 
(iii) The time required to discover and 
report defective replacements. 
(5) Markings. The packaging and preservation 
requirements of the contract shall require the contractor to 
stamp or mark the supplies delivered or otherwise furnished 
notice with the supplies of the existence of the warranty. 
The purpose of the markings or notice is to inform Government 
personnel who store, stock, or use the supplies that the 
supplies are under warranty. Markings may be brief but should 
include 
warranty exists, 




the substance of the warranty, 
its duration, and 
who to notify if the supplies 
are found to be defective. For commercial items (see 46.709), 
the contractor's trade practice in warranty marking is 
acceptable if sufficient information is presented for supply 
personnel and users to identify warranted supplies. 
( 6) Consistency. contracting officers 
shall ensure that the warranty clause and any other warranty 
conditions in the contract (e.g., in the specifications or an 
inspection clause) are consistent. To the extent practicable, 
all of the warranties to be contained in the contract should 
71 
be expressed in the warranty clause. 
6. Pricing Aspects of Fixed-price Incentive Contract 
warranties 
If a fixed-price incentive contract contains a warranty 
(see 46.708), the estimated cost of the warranty to the 
contractor should be considered in establishing the incentive 
target price and the ceiling price of the contract. all costs 
incurred, or estimated to be incurred, by the contractor in 
complying with the warranty shall be considered when 
establishing the total final price. Contractor compliance 
with the warranty after the establishment of the total final 
price shall be at no additional cost to the Government. 
7. Warranties of Data 
Warranties of data shall be developed and used in 
accordance with agency regulations. 
8. Warranties of Commercial Items 
If a warranty of commercial items lS appropriate, the 
contracting officer may include a warranty of supplies clause 
modified for commercial items (see the clause at 52.246-17, 
warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature, Alternate I, and 
52.246-18, warranty of supplies of a complex Nature, alternate 
I) . More appropriate warranty language may be included if the 
contracting officer determines that the Government's planned 
usage of the item is inconsistent with the item's normal 
usage, or that Government specifications have substantially 
altered the item. The Government may adopt the contractor's 
standard commercial warranty if the contracting officer 
determines it is not inconsistent with the rights that would 
be afforded the Government under a warranty of supplies clause 
(see the clauses at 52.246-17, Warranty of Supplies of 
Noncomplex Nature, and 52.246-18, Warranty of supplies of a 
Complex Nature) or other terms of the contract. 
9. Contract Clauses 
The clauses and alternates prescribed in this section may 
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be used in solicitations and contracts in which inclusion of 
warranty overage is appropriate. However, because of the many 
situations tat may influence the warranty terms and conditions 
appropriate to a particular acquisition, the contracting 
officer may vary the terms and conditions of the clauses and 
alternates to the extent necessary. The alternates prescribed 
in this section address the clauses; however, the conditions 
pertaining to each alternate must be considered if the terms 
and conditions are varied to meed a particular need. 
(a) ( 1) The contracting officer may insert a clause 
substantially the same as the clause at 52.246-17, Warranty of 
Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature, in solicitations and 
contracts for noncomplex items when a fixed price supply 
contract is contemplated and the use of a warranty clause has 
been approved under agency procedures. 
(2) If commercial items are to be acquired, the 
contracting officer may use the clause with its Alternate I. 
( 3) If it is desirable to specify that 
necessary transportation incident to correction or replacement 
will be at the Governments' expense (as might be the case if, 
for example, the cost of a warranty would otherwise be 
prohibitive), the contracting officer may use the clause with 
its Alternate II. 
(4) If the supplies cannot be obtained from 
another source, the contracting officer may use the clause 
with its Alternate III. 
( 5) If a fixed-price incentive contract is 
contemplated, the contracting officer may use the clause with 
its Alternative IV. 
(6) If it is anticipated that recovery of the 
warranted item will involve considerable Government expense 
for disassembly and/or reassembly of larger items, the 
contracting officer may use the clause with its Alternate v. 
(b) ( 1) the contracting officer may insert a 
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clause substantially the same as the clause at 52.246-18, 
Warranty of Supplies of a Complex Nature, in solicitations and 
contracts for deliverable complex items when a fixed price 
supply or research and development contract is contemplated 
and the use of a warranty clause has been approved under 
agency procedures. 
(2) If commercial items are to be acquired, 
the contracting officer may use the clause with its Alternate 
I. 
(3) If it lS desirable to specify that 
necessary transportation incident to correction or replacement 
will be at the Government's expense (as might be the case if, 
for example, the cost of a warranty would otherwise be 
prohibitive), the contracting officer may use the clause with 
its Alternate II. 
( 4) If a fixed-price incentive contract is 
contemplated, the contracting officer may use the clause with 
its Alternate III. 
(5) If it is anticipated that recovery of the 
warranted item will involve considerable Government expense 
for disassembly and/or reassembly of larger items, the 
contracting officer may use the clause with its Alternative 
IV. 
(c) ( 1) the contracting officer may insert a 
clause substantially the same as the clause at 52.246-19, 
Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance 
Specifications or Design Criteria, 1n solicitations and 
contracts when performance specifications or design are of 
major importance; a fixed-price supply, service, or research 
and development contract for systems and equipment is 
contemplated; and the use of a warranty clause has been 
approved under agency procedures. 
(2) If it is desirable to specify that 
necessary transportation incident to correction or replacement 
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cost of a warranty would otherwise be 
contracting officer may use the clause with 
If a fixed-price incentive contract is 
contracting officer may use the clause with 
(4) If it is anticipated that recovery of the 
warranted item will involve considerable Government expense 
for disassembly and/or reassembly of larger items, the 
contracting office may use the clause with its Alternate III> 
(d) The contracting officer may insert a clause 
substantially the same as the clause at 52.246-20, Warranty of 
Services, in solicitations and contract for services when a 
fixed-price contract for services is contemplated and the use 
of a warranty clause has been approved under agency 
procedures; unless a clause substantially the same as the 
clause at 52.246-19, Warranty of Systems and Equipment under 
Performance Specifications or Design Criteria has been used. 
(e) ( 1) The contracting officer may insert a clause 
substantially the same as the clause at 52.246-21, Warranty of 
construction, in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-
price construction contract (see 46.705(c)) is contemplated 
and the use of a warranty clause has been approved under 
agency procedures. 
(2) If the Government specifies in the 
contract the use of any equipment by "brand name and model," 
the contracting officer may use the clause with its Alternate 
I. (FAR part 46, subpart 702-710 pp. 18921-18925) 
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APPENDIX C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY 
A. DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 246 with each 
subpart is provided in its entirety for the readers reference 
to specific regulatory issues regarding warranties. Key 
factors in Government Procurement are reviewed with the basic 
document for a clear understanding of the intent of the 
regulation. 
B. DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
1. 246.701 Definitions 
Acceptance, as defined in FAR 46.701 and as used in this 
subpart and in the warranty clauses at FAR 52.246-17, Warranty 
of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature; FAR 52.246-18, Warranty of 
Supplies of a Complex Nature; FAR 52.246-19, Warranty of 
Systems and Equipment Under Performance Specifications or 
Design Criteria; and FAR 52.246-20, Warranty of Services, 
includes the execution of an official document (e.g., DD Form 
250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report) by an 
authorized representative of the Government. 
Defect, as used in this subpart, means any condition or 
characteristic in any supply or service furnished by the 
contractor under the contract that is not in compliance with 
the requirements of the contract. 
2. 246.702 General 
Departments and agencies shall establish procedures to 
track and accumulate data on warranty costs. 
3. 246.703 Criteria for use of Warranties 
The use of warranties 1n the acquisition of weapon 
systems is mandatory (10 U.S.C> 2403) unless a waiver is 
authorized (see 246.770-8). 
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(b) Cost. Contracting officers may include the cost of 
a warranty as part of an item's pr1.ce or as a separate 
contract line item. 
4. 246.704 Authority for use of Warranties 
The chief of the contracting office must approve use of 
a warranty, except in acquisitions for--
(1) Weapons Systems (see 246.770) 
(2) Commercial supplies or services (see FAR 
46.709); 
(3) Technical data, unless the warranty provides 
for extended liability (see 246.708) 
( 4) Supplies and services in fixed price type 
contracts containing quality assurance provisions that 
reference MIL-I-45208, Inspection System Requirement, or MIL-
Q-9858, Quality Program Requirements; or 
( 5) Supplies and services in construction contracts 
when using the warranties that are contained in Federal, 
Military, or construction guide specifications. 
5. 246.705 Limitations 
(a) Warranties in the clause at 252.246-7001, warranty 
of Data, are also an exception to the prohibition on use of 
warranties in cost-reimbursement contracts. 
6. 246.706 Warranty Ter.ms and Conditions 
(b) (5) Markings. Use MIL Standard 129 Marking for 
Shipments and Storage, and MIL Standard 130, Identification 
Marking of U.S. Military Property, when marking warranty 
items. 
7. 246.708 Warranties of Data 
Obtain warranties on technical data when practicable and 
cost-effective. Consider the factors 1.n FAR 46.703. in 
deciding whether to obtain warranties of technical data. 
Consider the following in deciding whether to use extended 
liability provisions--
(1) The likelihood that correction or replacement 
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of the nonconforming data, or a price adjustment, will not 
give adequate protection to the Government; and 
(2) The effectiveness of the additional remedy as 
a deterrent against furnishing nonconforming data. 
8. 246.710 Contract Clauses 
( 1) Use a clause substantially the same as the 
clause at 252.246-7013, Rights in Technical Data and Computer 
Software, and there is a need for greater protection or period 
of liability than provided by other contract clauses, such as 
the clauses at--
(i) FAR 52.246-3, Inspection of Supplies--
Cost-Reimbursement; 
(ii) FAR 52.246-6, Inspection-- Time-and-
Material and Labor-Hour; 
(iii) FAR 52.246-8, Inspection of Research and 
Development-- Cost-Reimbursement; and 
(iv) FAR 52.246-19, Warranty of Systems and 
Equipment Under Performance Specifications or Design Criteria. 
(2) Use the clause at 252.246-7001, Warranty of 
Data, with its Alternate I when extended liability is desired 
and fixed price incentive contract is contemplated. 
(3) Use the clause at 252.246-7001, Warranty of 
Data, and with its Alternate II when extended liability is 
desired and a firm fixed price contract is contemplated. 
9. 246.770 Warranties in Weapon System Acquisitions 
This section sets forth policies and procedures for use 
of warranties in contracts for weapon system production. 
10. 246.770-1 Definitions 
As used in this section--
(a) At no additional cost to the government means--
(1) At no increase in price for firm fixed price 
contracts; 
(2) At no increase in target or ceiling price for 
fixed price incentive contracts (see also FAR 46.707); or 
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(3) At no increase in estimated cost or fee for 
cost-reimbursement contracts. 
(b) Design and manufacturing requirements means 
structural and engineering plans and manufacturing 
including prec~se measurements, tolerances, 




(c) Essential performance requirements means the 
operating capabilities and maintenance and reliability 
characteristics of a weapon system that the agency head 
determines to be necessary to fulfill the military 
requirement. 
(d) Initial production quantity means the number of 
units of a weapon system contracted for in the first program 
year of full-scale production. 
(e) Maturer full-scale production means follow-on 
production of a weapon system after manufacture of the lesser 
of the initial production quantity or one-tenth of the 
eventual total production quantity. 
(f) Weapon system means a system or major subsystem used 
directly by the Armed Forces to carry out combat missions. 
(1) the term includes, but is not limited to, the 
following (if intended for use in carrying out combat 
missions)--
(i) Tracked and wheeled combat vehicles; 
(ii) Self-propelled, towed and fixed guns, 
howitzers and mortars; 
(iii) Helicopters; 
(iv) Naval vessels; 
(v) Bomber, fighter, 
electronic warfare aircraft; 
reconnaissance and 
(vi) Strategic and tactical missiles including 
launching systems; 
(vii) Guided munitions; 
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(viii) Military surveillance, command, 
control, and communication systems; 
(ix) Military cargo vehicles and aircraft; 
(x) Mines; 
(xi) Torpedoes; 
(xii) Fire control systems; 
(xiii) Propulsion systems; 
(xiv) Electronic warfare systems; and 
(xv) safety and survival systems. 
(2) The term does not include--
(i) Commercial items sold in substantial 
quantities to the general public (see FAR 15.804-3(c)); or 
(ii) spares, repairs or replenishment parts; 
or 
(iii) related support equipment (e.g., ground-
handling equipment, training devices and accessories, 
ammunition), unless an effective warranty would require 
inclusion of such items. 
11. 246.770-2 Policy 
(a) Under 10 U.S.C. 2403, departments and agencies may 
not contract for the production of a weapon system with a unit 
weapon system cost of more than $100, 000 or and estimated 
total procurement cost in excess of $10 million unless-
(1) Each contractor for the weapon system provides 
the Government written warranties that--
(i) the weapon system conforms to the design 
and manufacturing requirements ln the contract (or any 
modifications to that contract), 
( ii) The weapon system lS free from all 
defects in materials and workmanship at the time of acceptance 
or delivery as specified in the contract; and 
(iii) the weapon system, if manufactured in 
mature full-scale production, conforms the essential 
performance requirements of the contract (or any modification 
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to that contract); and 
(2) The contract terms provide that, in the event 
the weapon system fails to meet the terms of the above 
warra~ties, the contracting officer may--
(i) Require the contractor to promptly track 
necessary corrective action (e.g., repair, replace, and/or 
redesign) at no additional cost to the Government; 
( ii) Require the contractor to pay costs 
reasonably incurred by the Government in taking necessary 
corrective action; or 
(iii) Equitably reduce the contract price; or 
(3) A waiver is granted under 246.770-8. 
(b) contracting officers may require warranties that 
provide greater coverage and remedies than specified in 
paragraph (a) of this subsection, such as including an 
essential performance requirement warranty ln other than a 
mature full-scale production contract. 
(c) When the contract includes an essential performance 
requirement warranty, the warranty must identify redesign as 
a remedy available to the Government. 
( 1) The period during which redesign must be 
available as a remedy shall not end before operational use, 
operational testing, or a combination of operational use and 
operational testing has demonstrated that the warranted item's 
design has satisfied the essential performance requirements. 
( 2) When essential performance requirements are 
warranted in contracts with alternate source contractors, do 
not include redesign as a remedy available to the Government 
under those contracts until the alternate source has 
manufactured the first ten percent of the eventual total 
production quantity anticipated to be acquired from that 
contractor (see 246.770-5). 
12. 246.770-3 Tailoring Warranty Terms and Conditions 
(a) Since the objectives and circumstances vary 
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considerably among weapon system acquisition programs, 
contracting offices must tailor the required warranties on a 
case-by-case basis. The purpose of tailoring is to get a 
cost-effective warranty in light of the technical risk, or 
other program uncertainties, while ensur1ng that the 
Government still acquires the basic warranties described in 
246.770-2. Tailoring shall not be used as a substitute for 
acquiring a warranty waiver. 
( 1) Tailoring may affect remedies, exclusions, 
limitations, and duration provided such are consistent with 
the specific requirements of this section (see also FAR 
46.706). 
(2) Clearly relate the duration of any warranty to 
the contract requirements and allow sufficient time to 
demonstrate achievement of the requirements after acceptance. 
(3) Tailor the terms of the warranty, if 
appropriate, to exclude certain defects for specified supplies 
(exclusions) or to limit the contractor's liability under the 
terms of the warranty (limitations). 
(4) Structure broader and more comprehensive 
warranties when advantageous or narrow the scope when 
appropriate. Fort example, it may be inappropriate to require 
warranty of all essential performance requirements for a 
contractor that did not design the system. 
(b) DOD policy is to exclude any terms that cover 
contractor liability for loss, damage, or injury to third 
parties from warranty clauses. 
(c) Ensure acquisition of subsystems and components in 




246.770-4 Warranties on Government-Furnished 
Contracting officers shall not require contractors to provide 
the warranties specified in 246.770-2 on any property 
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furnished the contractor by the Government, except for--
(a) Defects in installation; 
(b) Installation or modification in such a manner that 
invalidates a warranty provided by the manufacturer of the 
property; or 
(c) Modifications made to the property by the 
contractor. 
14. 246.770-5 Exemption for Alternate Source 
Contractor(s) 
Agency heads may exempt alternate source contractor(s) 
from the essential performance warranty requirements of 
246.770-2(a) (1) (iii) until that contractor manufactures the 
first ten percent of its anticipated total production 
quantity. 
15. 246.770-6 Applicability to Foreign Miliary Sales 
(FMS) 
(a) The warranty requirements of 246.770-2 are not 
mandatory for FMS production contracts. DOD policy is to 
obtain the same warranties on conformance to design and 
manufacturing requirements and against defects in material and 
workmanship as it gets for U.S. supplies. 
(b) DOD normally will not obtain essential performance 
warranties for FMS purchasers. However, where contracting 
officer cannot separately identify the cost for the warranty 
of essential performance requirements, the foreign purchase 
shall be given the same warranty that_the United States gets. 
(c) If an FMS purchaser expressly requests a 
performance warranty in the letter of acceptance, the 
Government will exert its best efforts to obtain the s.ame 
warranty obtained for U.S. equipment. Or, if specifically 
requested by the FMS purchaser, obtain a unique warranty. 
(d) The costs for warranties for FMS purchasers may be 
different from the costs for such warranties for the 
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Government due to factors such as overseas transportation and 
any tailoring to reflect the unique aspects of the FMS 
purchaser. 
(e) Ensure that FMS purchasers bear all of the 
acquisition and administrative costs of any warranties. 
16. 246.770-7 Cost-benefit Analysis 
(a) In assessing the cost-effectiveness of a proposed 
warranty, perform an analysis which considers both the 
quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits of the 
warranty. Consider--
(1) Costs of warranty acquisition, administration, 
enforcement, and user costs, and any costs resulting from 
limitations imposed by the warranty provisions; 
(2) Costs incurred during development specifically 
for the purpose of reducing production warranty risks; 
(3) Logistical and operational benefits as a 
result of the warranty as well as the impact of the additional 
contractor motivation provided by the warranty. 
(b) Where possible, make a comparison with the costs of 
obtaining and enforcing similar warranties on similar systems. 
(c) Document the analysis in the contract file. If the 
warranty is not cost-effective, initiate a waiver request 
under 246.770-8. 
17. 246.770-8 Waiver and Notification Procedures 
(a) The Secretary of Defense has delegated waiver 
authority within the limits specified in 10 U.S.C.2403. The 
waiving authority for the defense agencies is the Assistance 
Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics). The waiving 
authority for the military departments is the Secretary of the 
department with authority to redelegate no lower than· an 
Assistance Secretary. The waiving authority may waive one or 
more of the weapons system warranties required by 246.770-2 
if--
( 1) the waiver is 1n the interests of national 
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defense; or 
(2) the warranty would not be cost effective. 
(b) Waiving authorities must make the following 
notifications or reports to the Senate and House Committees on 
Armed Services and Appropriations for all waivers--
( 1) Major weapon systems. For a weapon system that 
is a major Defense acquisition program for the purpose of 10 
U.S.C. 2432, the waiving official must notify the Committees 
in writing of an intention to waive one or more of the 
required warranties. Included an explanation of the reasons 
for the waiver in the notice. Ordinarily provide the notice 
30 days before granting a waiver. 
(2) Other Weapon Systems. For weapon systems that 
are not major Defense acquisition programs for the purpose of 
10 U.S.C. 2432, waiving officials must submit an annual 
report not later than February 1 of each year. List the 
waivers granted in the preceding calendar year in the report 
and include an explanation of the reasons for granting each 
waiver. 
(3) Weapon Systems Not in Mature Full-Scale 
Production. Although a wa1ver is not required, if a 
production contract for a major weapon system not yet in 
mature full-scale production will not include a warranty on 
essential performance requirements, the waiving officials must 
comply with the notice requirements for major weapon systems. 
(c) departments and agencies shall issue procedures for 
processing waivers, notifications, and reports to Congress. 
(1} request for waiver shall include--
(i) A brief description of the weapon system 
and its stage of production, e.g., the number of units 
delivered and anticipated to be delivered during the life of 
the program; 
(ii) Identification of the specific warranty 
or warranties required by 246.770-2 {a) {1) for which the waiver 
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is requested; 
(iii) the duration of the waiver if it is to 
go beyond the contract; 
(vi) the rationale for the waiver (if the 
waiver request is based on cost effectiveness, include the 
results of the cost-benefit analysis); 
(v) A description of the warranties or other 
techniques used to ensure acceptable field performance of the 
weapon system, e.g., warranties, commercial or the guarantees 
obtained on individual components; and 
applicable. 
(2) 
(vi) Exercise date of the warranty option, if 
Notifications and reports shall include--
(i) A brief description of the weapon system 
and its stage of production; and 
(ii) Rationale for not obtaining a warranty. 
(3) Keep a written record of each waiver granted 
and notification and report made, together with supporting 
documentation such as a cost-benefit analysis, for use in 
answering inquiries. (DOD 246.701 pp. 24810-24814) 
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APPENDIX D. UNITED STATES ARMY ACQUISITION POLICY 
A. UNITED STATES ARMY FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
The United States Army Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Part 46 with each subpart is provided in its entirety for the 
readers reference to specific regulatory issues regarding 
warranties. Key factors in Government Procurement are 
reviewed with the basic document for a clear understanding of 
the intent of the regulation. 
B. ARMY 46.770: QUALITY ASSURANCE 
1. 46.770-1 Definitions , 
(c) Authority to designate which features of a weapon 
system are its essential performance requirements and to 
subsequently modify, supersede or cancel such requirements is 
delegated to the Heads of Contracting Activity (HCA' s), 
without authority to redelegate. See Warranty Guidebook, 
Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-
5426, for information on selection of essential performance 
requirements. [Al 92-4,4/24/92; AL 93-3, 3/31/93] 
2. 46.770-5 Exemption for Alternate Source 
Contractor(s) 
Requests for exemption shall be signed by the HCA and 
forward to the address in 1.290(b) (1) prior to award of the 
contract. AMC organizations shall forward such requests 
through Headquarters, AMC. [AL 92-4, 4/24/92] 
3. 46.770-7 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(c) Document the results of the analysis in the Business 
Clearance Memorandum. If it is uncertain whether a cost-
effecting warranty can be obtain, and time does not permit 
further analysis, obtaining a waiver, or making the required 
notifications prior to contract award, the contract may be 
awarded if--
(i) The contract provides that the warranty may be 
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delete.::l from the contract and an equitable adjustment 
obtained, and 
(ii) An award on such a basis has been approved by 
the HeaJ of the Contracting Activity. This approval authority 
shall not be redelegate. [AL 92-4, 4/24/92] 
4. 46.770-8 Waiver and Notification Procedures 
(a) Request for waiver shall be signed by the Head 
of the Contracting activity and shall be submitted with 
supporting justification (through Headquarters, AMC for AMC 
organizations to the addressee in 1.290{b) (1) at least 45 days 
prior to the anticipated award date. Contract award will not 
be made until the wa1ver 1s approved and Congressional 
notification (when required) 1s complete. 
(c) (1) (S-90) each request for waiver will include 
the information required by DFARS 246.770-S(c) (1) plus: 
(i) Identification of all warranty costs and 
procedures used to evaluate cost-effectiveness. This should 
include benefits of warranty vs cost to Government to 
administer and enforce warranty, cost for correction or 
replacement in absence of warranty and costs to keep 
warranties in effect. 
(ii) The efforts made to negotiate a modified 
warranty, i.e., tradeoff of contractor liability or duration 
of warranty period to reduce cost. 
(iii) Warranties obtained on individual 
components where the entire system is not under warranty. If 
warranties were not obtained, provide rationale. 
(iv) Actions taken to preclude waivers on 
future procurements. {AL 92-4, 4/24/92] 
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APPENDIX E. SECTION 800 PANEL REPORT EXCERPT 
A. SECTION 800 PANEL 
The Section 800 Panel was convened to review Acquisition 
regulations and determine how best to streamline acquisition 
in the Government. The goal of efficiency and effectiveness 
done at the minimum dollar cost while preserving our 
Democratic perception to the public. Chapter two of the 
Section 800 Panel is provided in its entirety for the readers 
reference to specific regulatory issues regarding warranties 
and the Section 800 Panel's conclusions and recommendation. 
Key factors in Government Procurement are reviewed with the 
basic document for a clear understanding of the intent of the 
regulation. 
B. CONCLUSIONS OF SECTION 800 PANEL 
In a memorandum the Headquarters Air Force Materiel 
command, directorate of Program Support, noted that the 
overall intent and purpose of the warranty statue is working, 
but problems have been identified. It believes that the 
requirements for congressional notification and waiver 
authority have stifled attempts to waive the warranty where it 
would not be cost-effective. The AF Material Command Program 
Support directorate also noted that the Air force submits few 
request for waivers because of this difficult process. It 
contends that the approval of waivers at a lower authority 
level, the Head of the Contracting Activity, for instance 
would allow for more waivers where the warranty is not cost-
effective. An acquisition staff analyst of AF Materiel 
Command argues that while the intent of the statue is valid, 
"the implementation is severely lacking. " To improve this 
situation, he recommends improving the guidance for conducting 
warranty cost-benefit analyses. He further contends that the 
cost of the warranty only provides a marginal benefit, and the 
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relationship of the warranty to the specifications is often 
unclear. The analyst believes that the "existing FAR warranty 
clauses and correction of defects clauses, along with latent 
defects and performance provisions are often adequate to 
preclude the need for a special weapon systems warranty 
clause, " and recommends that the law be amended to raise the 
contractor liability limits so that the contractor bears more 
of ·the risk of the warranty. 
The Navy also agreed with the conclusions reached by the 
study performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition. The Navy noted that half of its 
major buying commands had supported a total repeal of this 
statute while the other half supported an amendment to permit 
flexibility in the application of future warranties. The Navy 
took the position that this statute should be repealed. On 
the other hand, the Army did not agree with the study's 
conclusions. It contends that warranties offer tangible and 
intangible benefits, including promoting "product quality 
improvements which make costly warranty repairs unnecessary." 
The Army contends that although there are significant problems 
with the current administration of warranties, they do serve 
a valid purpose. 
the Inspector General of the Department of Defense 
(DODIG) commented that it believes that this law is serving 
its intended purpose, is still relevant, has not created 
inefficiencies, and is required for the continuing financial 
and ethical integrity of the DOD procurement process. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE SECTION 800 
PANEL 
Repeal 10 U.S.C. 2403 requiring contractor guarantees on 
major weapons systems. 
The Panel recommends that this section be repealed. 
Although the DODIG and the Army have commented that this 
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statute is serving its intended purpose, the results of the 
two studies cited above and the other numerous comments 
received show significant problems in the administration and 
effectiveness of weapon system warranties in every branch of 
DOD. The problems the Services are experiencing not only 
cause serious administrative burdens on the Government but can 
make the warranties of very limited value, because the 
Government is not always able to make successful warranty 
claims. Also, the reluctance of DOD to issue warranty waivers 
fosters the use of warranties without regard to their cost-
effectiveness. 
The Panel believes that warranties would be much more 
effective if the law permitted more flexible implementation 
and tailoring to program specific needs. In this way, the 
Services could purchase effective warranties or make other 
arrangements when warranties would not be cost-effective. By 
this recommendation, the Panel is not suggesting that 
warranties unnecessary in all cases, but that they should be 
used only when appropriate. The Panel recommends that clear, 
specific guidance should be included 1n the regulations 
govern1ng purchase of warranties and issuance of waivers. 
As an alternative, the Panel recommends that this section 
be revised to address problems associated with its 
implementation. 
In 1984, Congress had noted that the military departments 
were not negotiation warranty provisions but mandating their 
inclusion in procurement contract. Even though congress had 
stated that it intended waivers to be given if the warranties 
would not be cost-effective, virtually no waivers had been 
issued. It also found that the regulatory implementation of 
the provision should provide better guidance to the field 
personnel. It is clear from the comments received that the 
problems that congress noted at he passage of this statue in 
1984 appear to still exist today, and the flexibility Congress 
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attempted to build into the statute has not solved these 
problems. The Panel believes that waivers must be more 
readily available ln the acquisition process for those 
instances where a warranty would not be cost-effective. To 
this end, the Panel recommends that the approval of waivers be 
at a much lower level. Vesting the waiver authority in a 
lower level official will help expedite waiver approval. The 
Panel also agrees that SOS should promulgate a policy 
statement supporting the use of waivers when a warranty would 
not be cost-effective and should actively encourage the use of 
waivers in any further implementation or guidance. 
The Panel believes that the warranty program must be 
improved if it ls to be used with any measure of cost-
effectiveness. The Panel concurs that the measures suggested 
in the AFLMC study would greatly improve the present warranty 
administration system. The Panel also agrees with the Office 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition that warranties should be limited to major weapon 
systems. These two suggestions should focus the 
administration system on those large contracts where 
warranties would be most effectively employed. While the 
Panel still believes that the best course of action would be 
to repeal this statute, the above recommendations, if 
accepted, can make significant improvements to the statute as 
drawn. 
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APPENDIX F. WARRANTY HISTORY AND LEGISLATION 
A. PROPOSED WARRANTY LAW 
This appendix is a complete citation of the proposed 
warranty statute currently in committee. This law originated 
in the House in 1993, the Senate approved it in 1994, and was 
set to Congressional Committee in 1994. It is expected to be 
passed by the Congress as stated in paragraph B. 
B. PROPOSED WARRANTY LEGISLATION 
1. United States Code, Title 10, Section 2402, Special 
Supplement, July 4, 1994. (House Version 1587) Printed as 
reported not as passed 
Contractor guarantees regarding weapon systems. 
{a) Repeal of requirement for report on waivers.--subsection 
{e) of section 2403 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended--
{1) by striking out "(1)' and 
(2) by striking out paragraph (2). 
(b) Provisions to be addressed by regulations.-- subsection 
(h) of such section is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and 
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
paragraph {2): 
"(2) the regulations hall include the following: 
"(A) Guidelines for negotiating contractor 
guarantees that are reasonable and cost-effective, as 
determined on the basis of the likelihood of defects and the 
estimated cost of correcting such defects. 
"(B) Procedures for administering contractor guarante·es. 
"(C) Guidelines for determining the cases in which it may 
be appropriate to waive the requirements of this section". 
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2. United States Code, Title 10, Section 2402, Special 
Supplement, JUly 4, 1994. (Senate Version s 2207) Printed as 
passed 
(a) Repeal of requirement for report on waivers.--subsection 
(e) of section 2403 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended--
(2) by striking out paragraph (2). 
(b) Provisions to be addressed by regulations.-- subsection 
(h) of such section is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and 
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
paragraph ( 2) : 
"(2) the regulations hall include the following: 
" (A) Guidelines for negotiating contractor 
guarantees that are reasonable and cost-effective, as 
determined on the basis of the likelihood of defects and the 
estimated cost of correcting such defects. 
"(B) Procedures for administering contractor guarantees. 
"(C) Guidelines for determining the cases in which it may 
be appropriate to waive the requirements of this section". 
3. United States Code, Title 10, Section 2402, Per John 
Etherton, 17 AUG 94 
This legislation is in Conference Committee now. Mr. John 
Etherton stated he believed that the Senate would recede to 
the house language. The difference in the House and Senates 
version is (e) (1), the reporting requirement as stated below: 
(e) (1) Before making a waiver under subsection (d) with 
respect to a weapon system that is a major defense acquisition 
program for the purpose of section 2432 of this title, the 
Secretary of Defense shall notify the Committees on Armed 
Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives in writing of his intention to waive any or 
all of the requirements of subsection (b) with respect to that 
system and shall include in the notice an explanation of the 
reasons for the waiver. 
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(2) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to the committees specified in 
paragraph (1) a report identifying each waiver made under 
subsection (d) during the preceding calendar year for a weapon 
system that is not a major defense acquisition program for the 
purpose of section 2432 of this title and shall include in the 
report an explanation of the reasons for the waivers. 
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APPENDIX G. INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Interview of Attitudes Toward Warranties 
in the Department of Defense 
Your interview will be treated as confidential. 
Please review and cormnent on each interview question. 
Answer each question to best describe your opinion of using 
warranties in weapon system acquisition. 
This lS a Naval Postgraduate School student thesis 
interview. Your help is appreciated. Please return this 
interview questionnaire to CPT Sharon Reiff at FAX number 408-
656-2138. Results will be presented in the thesis titled: 
Warranty Legislation Effectiveness. For further information 
regarding this questionnaire contact CPT Reiff at 408-647-
9151. 
1. How long have your been in your present position? ______ __ 




3. What purpose does a warranty serve to the government? 
Explain: 
4. What purpose does a warranty serve to the cormnercial 




5. Which technique used to estimate the value of a warranty 
would you rank as the most effective? 
a. Models 
b. Cost-benefit analysis 
c. Explain: 




7. Are cost-benefit analysis utilized to determine the 




8. In your opinion: Is the cost of a warranty regularly 





9. In your opinion: Are waivers sought based on the results 




10. In your opinion: Are thorough cost-benefit analyses 




11. In your opinion: Is the expense for Cost-benefit 










Is it difficult to get a wa1ver 
13. In your opinion: About how many waivers have you seen 
requested, evaluated, and granted? 
1. Number requested: 
2. Number evaluated: 
3. Number granted: __ _ 
4. Comment: 
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14. In your opinion: How often are thorough cost-benefit 





15. Would you recommend meeting the intent of legislation of 




If you have additional comments about this interview 
please feel free to comment. 
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APPENDIX H. INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
The appendix contains the questions followed by the 
responses. The responses were recorded with a number that was 
established 1n sequence with its receipt. The numbers 
represent a respondents answers and is consistent throughout 
the document. Identification of each respondent has been 
negated with the exception of their title, and years of 
experience as referenced. 
a. Question 1 
What is your present position and how long have you 
been 1n your present position? 
b. Responses: 
1. Acting Division Chief, 10.5 years 
2. Chief, Readiness Management Division, 1.5 years 
3. Director of Materials, 5 years 
4. Program manager, 2 years 
5. Manager of contracts, 20 years 
6. Program manager, 4 years 
7. Director of Government business relations, 40 years 
8. Chief, Business Management Division, 3 years 
9. Program manager, 8 years 
10. Contract Negotiator, 12 years 
11. Manager of warranty and maintenance cost, 10 years 
c. Question 2 
In your opinion, are warranties applicable to 
military weapon systems? 
d. Responses : 
1. Yes, by law they are applicable, but they do not really 
make sense. 
2. Yes, it enables the Government to save on the cost of 
repairs beyond what would be expected. This is the newer trend 
with threshold warranties. 
3 . Yes and NO, the answer depends on the contract type 
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employed by the Government. Under cost-reimbursement types, 
warranty costs become allowable and allocable to the same 
extent as other costs, and thus a warranty requirement allows 
the government to obtain repairs on a non-fee bearing basis, 
but still must bear the target costs and any overrun costs. 
Under fixed price contracts, a warranty requirement can result 
in obtaining "no cost" repairs and is particularly useful in 
avoiding expenses associated with latent defects that may 
surface after substantial quantities are acquired. Warranty 
provisions clearly have their place as a part of the 
requirements for a major weapon system, but technical 
requirements that require reliability to be designed into a 
product have an equally important role. All warranty 
provisions represent a potential cost that must be paid for. 
One area of real concern is warranty shelf life (i.e. warranty 
starts upon acceptance of the item but lapses before use if 
the item is stored or "shelved" for an extended period of 
time). 
4. Yes, for combat systems. 
5. Yes, prior to 1984, DOD policy was not to incur the added 
expense of warranty. Added expenses of warranty are: 
Acquisition cost, O&S Cost, record keeping, tracking the 
products through depots and tactical units in the U.S. and 
OCONUS, periodic testing to evaluate the product warranty, 
transportation, and administration. The stated congressional 
purpose was to obtain the same warranty as a John Deer 
Tractor. 
6. Yes, if properly written and administered. 
7. Yes, selectively and in discrete circumstances. 
8. Yes. 
9. Yes. 
10. No, Warranties are redundant to the myriad of regulations, 
specifications, quality assurance requirements, etc. which a 
contractor is forced to accept and comply with in any fixed 
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price major system purchase. 
inconsistent with purchases 
contracting mode. 
11. Yes 
e. Question 3 
What purpose does 
Government? 
f. Responses: 
1. Frankly, the major one 
requirement to have a warranty. 
Obviously warranties are 
1n a cost-reimbursement 
a warranty serve to the 
lS satisfying the statutory 
To the extent we can use the 
warranty for leverage, we do. 
have successfully recovered 
In a limited number of cases we 
substantial benefit. But 
warranties are clearly a benefit to contractors because they 
limit their liability. For instance they establish time 
limits on their responsibility. Before the warranty, we would 
have required full correction of welding errors or other 
similar problems almost indefinitely -- whenever a significant 
defect in material, workmanship or design was found. 
2. It enables the Government to save the cost of repairs 
beyond what would be expected. This is the newer trend with 
threshold warranties. 
3. A warranty provides a degree of protection to a customer. 
In their most common form, warranties guard against incurring 
future costs for defects in materials and workmanship. More 
complex warranties can also be structured to guarantee product 
performance in the future and require that the full cost of 
redesign and hardware/software implementation to achieve the 
warranted performance be born by a contractor. Therefore, the 
11 insurance 11 that warranties represent may or may not be worth 
the cost paid for them. The Government must undertake an 
analysis of the circumstances of a given contract in order to 
make an informed decision. 
4. For the vast majority of systems and warranties, no useful 
purpose is served to the Government. 
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5. A warranty does provide the Government with added time to 
determine/locate specified defects in items which existed at 
acceptance. Defects can be in material, workmanship, non-
compliance with the Technical Data Package or failure to meet 
performance as tested during the warranty period and to have 
the defects repaired or replaced. Sometimes, warranties are 
confused with service contracts. For example, Sears would 
warranty a washing machine for 90 days for defects in material 
and workmanship. A performance warranty is not available 
(i.e. Sears does not guarantee that your washing machine will 
wash 25 loads of clothes every day and that the cloths will be 
clean.) Sears does offer to sell the consumer an extended 
warranty at added cost whereby Sears will send a service 
technician to your house to repair or replace any specified 
defective or worn part which prevents the washing machine from 
washing in its customary fashion during the extended warranty 
period. This "extended warranty" is in effect a "service 
contract". Most commercial computer companies, (e.g. , IBM 
etc) sell a service contract with the hardware. Most buyers, 
industry, government, non-profits, etc., procure these service 
contracts. Most renew them. Use - buyer is entitled to use 
the product without patent infringement claims by others. If 
there is a patent or other intellectual property right claim 
by others, seller will defend the claim at its expense and 
will clear the claim promptly and/or obtain the right for 
Buyer (and its customers) to use the product free and clear or 
will replace the product or will compensate Buyer. Intended 
use or application may be guaranteed by Seller if the product 
is designed for a particular use which is specified in detail. 
In many cases, it lS not practical to specify all the 
conditions of intended use nor to pay the costs of testing for 
that use and a warranty is specifically excluded for this 
purpose. 
6. It can save 0 & M dollars. 
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7. The purpose served is to ensure Government rights 
subsequent to final acceptance and deli very. However, I 
believe the inclusion of warranty provisions in production 
contract, as opposed to development contracts, is a major 
error since they serve in such instances more as a "service 
policy" rather than to ensure enhanced design, product 
reliability, and improved quality. In addition, in production 
contracts, they are a cost to the Government whether or not 
cost-effective or required. 
8. The positive response must be qualified to state that a 
warranty serves the Government only if it offers economic 
benefit. The contractors proposed warranty should be 
evaluated against alternative means of repair such as US 
Government organic repair capability at intermediate and depot 
repair facilities or by contract maintenance and overhaul. 
9. For new systems or when dealing with a contractor with a 
history of Quality Assurance problems, it serves as an 
effective control mechanism. 
10. Warranties are redundant to the myriad of regulations, 
specifications, quality assurance requirements, etc. which a 
contractor is forced to accept and comply with in any fixed 
price major system purchase. Obviously warranties are 
inconsistent with purchases 1n a cost-reimbursement 
contracting mode. 
11. If properly structured, it can provide a means for the 
government to obtain reimbursement for repairs during the 
"break in period" associated with a new piece of equipment. 
The government should not have to shoulder the cost of quality 
defects in manufacturing, assembly errors etc. 
g. Question 4 
What purpose does a warranty serve to the commercial 
section of business? 
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b. Responses : 
1. Originally, I suspect they were established to limit 
their liability for fixing or correcting their products. They 
also assisted their dealer networks by directing consumers 
back to the "authorized dealer" for after market work. Today 
they have grown into a marketing/sales tool. Customer 
satisfaction tool. 
2. I am not sure. I look upon them for my own personal home 
use as protection against infant mortality. 
3. A warranty is always recognized by the commercial consumer 
as a source of protection against incurring future costs for 
a product once bought at least during some defined time frame. 
Consumers use them as a measure of the quality or reliability 
of a product. 
4. Warranties provide assurance to customers that products 
meet expected quality standards. They also provide 
manufacturers with valuable information on product "infant 
mortality" rates. 
5. Commercial warranties usually specifically exclude 
warranties of merchantability, and damages including 
consequential damages, indirect damages, punitive damages, 
direct damages, etc. 
Material and workmanship defects existing at time of 
delivery/acceptance which are discovered within a stated time 
(typically 90 days - 6 months) and promptly reported to Seller 
upon discovery (typically, within 30 days) are warranted to be 
repaired or parts replaced. 
6. Guarantee of product reliability or performance. 
7. In the commercial sector, warranties serve to limit, rather 
than increase, purchaser rights under the uniform commercial 
code. This is a distinct difference from the Government's 
intention, which is to increase its rights over and above 
those provided for under the contract. 
8. Commercial warranties serve to offer the consumer a "hook" 
108 
by which to differentiate one suppliers product from a like 
product furnished by a competitor. When commercial warranties 
are separately priced, such as extended warranties on 
automobiles, it must be assumed that the cost risk of buying 
the warranty is greater that the risk of warranty repair. In 
effect the warranty sale becomes a separate profit center. 
Competing commercial contractors do not drive service which 
yields continual profit/loss. 
9. For a company with an effective QA program in place, it is 
a way to bump-up the profit margin. 
10. In the commercial environment, warranties often establish 
or preserve the rights of the customer relative to the 
acceptability and quality of the product purchased. 
11. It provides a tool similar to that described for the 
military during the early periods of operation as well as a 
means of cost containment. Most warranties are structured 
around the direct maintenance and labor cost and the cost of 
replacement parts. 
i. Question 5 
Which technique used to estimate the value of a 
warranty would you rank as the most effective, models or cost-
benefit analysis? 
j . Responses: 
1. Neither, because of poor data bases. . 11 garbage in -
garbage out II and they never truly address the conceptual 
weakness of the warranty in a military environment. That is, 
of having a warranty in the first place on a weapon system. 
Neither do they adequately consider unmeasurable and 
intangible negative and positive factors involved in the 
operation of a warranty. Some people let up on addressing 
quality, mistakenly thinking the warranty will do it for them 
and for the Army. It doesn't. 
2. Cost-benefit analysis: With the approach you look at the 
mean time between failure and cost of what type of repair and 
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say this is what it would cost the Government w/o a 
warranty. 
3. Both models and cost-benefit analysis techniques can be 
employed to estimate the value of a warranty. However, the 
results of both may not bear any relationship to the ultimate 
outcome of cost incurred or avoided because predicting future 
events or circumstances has obvious limitations. Clearly, 
this is the case for the major weapon systems where there are 
a multitude of variables at work at all times. 
4. Cost-benefit analysis (for combat systems) - because 
warranty provisions specify the parameters for warranty claims 
(many of which cannot be accommodated in tactical situations) . 
Actual warranted failures cannot be predicted with modeling. 
Cost-benefit would provide a better measure of warranty value. 
5. Sears Roebuck model. 
6. Cost-benefit analysis. It can scope the practicality of 
administering the warranty 1n the DOD system. 
7. There is no one technique that is "best" to estimate the 
value of a warranty. 
8. The cost-benefit analysis would appear to be the most 
useful tool. The Government should make pure estimates on new 
starts, or collect actual filed failure data for fielded 
systems and compare the cost of contractor warranty repair 
versus organic repair or commercial maintenance and overhaul 
contracts. 
9. Cost-benefit analysis, within the Government. Any savings 
which can be shown on paper (whether real or not) can make or 
break a program. 
10. I am not familiar with either technique as we do not 
estimate the value or cost of the warranty provided to the 
Government. The warranty, in our primary production contract, 
provides that the contract does not contain any direct or 
contingent costs associated with the warranty; What we refer 
to as a no-cost warranty. In this case, I think you could 
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equate no-cost with worthless. 
11. Models. We use reliability and Defense Management 
College models to forecast the expected, then a risk analysis 
lS performed. 
k. Question 6 
Are cost-benefit analysis performed effectively? 
1 . Responses : 
1. No, I haven't personally seen any that were effective. 
I have seen several that were terrible. 
2. Yes, they are the basis for the negotiations of the cost 
of the warranty. 
3. Yes, given that they are based on certain assumptions. 
4. No, Actual costs of warranties are difficult to 
ascertain. Benefits are assumed to be automatic, but many (if 
not most) claims do not meet warranty provisions and most 
warranty determination is made by the manufacturer. As 
warranty money is not returned to the user, benefit is also 
hard to measure. 
5. I do not have this information. 
6. Yes, sometimes -back to administration and practicality. 
7. No, I do not believe such analyses are even performed-
either before or after the fact. I believe that the evidence 
of so few waivers to date is documentation of the fact that 
warranties are being required irrespective of their cost-
effectiveness. 
8. Yes, When the U.S. Army procured initial warranties in the 
mid 1980's this was done on the premise the warranties were 
inherently good. In some instances, the actual occurrences of 
failure and warranty repair costs were far less than the 
annual cost of the warranty. This happened in large part due 
to the failure to implement any constructive cost-benefit 
analysis. 
9. No, They are always skewed to show a savings, often using 
unrealistic but logically sounding assumptions. 
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10. I am not familiar with either technique as we do not 
estimate the value or cost of the warranty provided to the 
Government. 
11. No, "hidden Costs" of a modification or retrofit are 
difficult to account for. 
m. OUestion 7 
Are cost-benefit analysis utilized to determine the 
necessity of a warranty for a weapon system? 
n. Responses: 
1. Warranties on weapon systems are required by law -- we run 
the analysis before/while negotiating a contract to see if the 
warranty is "cost-effective". Because the models are so poor 
and there is very little data, the answer almost always forces 
a contracting officer to negotiate a "no cost warranty". That 
probably isn't what was intended but that is the practical 
reality. In one major truck program ($1-$2 Billion) the model 
dictated no more than a $14.00 per truck warranty cost. Above 
that the model said, a warranty would not be cost-effective. 
There were several models on vehicles running from $26K to 
$70K. The contractor looked at the risk of having to replace 
one high cost component (possible random failures) as a 
significant issue. 
2. Yes, they are required by "law" so they are used. 
3. Yes, but again they have limitations. 
4. No, They are required by law and so written into 
contracts. Cost without warranties are unknown. Cost of 
warranties are therefore unknown. Because they are required 
by law, why spend money doing cost-benefit analysis? 
5. I do not have this information 
6. Yes, sometimes - is administration practical? There are 
no "real" savings. 
7. The necessity for a warranty is dictated by statute and 
implementing regulations, both of which in my view have been 
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misconstrued in execution. I think warranties are required 
without regard to cost, value, or need. The deviation process 
and the required level for approval, as well as the 
interpretation given the regulations, are at fault ... as well 
as the current climate influencing the exercise of contracting 
officer discretion. 
8. Yes, such analysis is necessary to support warranty 
approval for ACAT I programs or to sustain waivers. 
9. No, while benefit analysis are performed for this purpose, 
the real reason for determining the necessity of a warranty is 
always political. 
10. No response 
11. No, It is usually based on past experience with similar 
systems. 
o. Question 8 
In your opinion, 1s the cost of a warranty regularly 
evaluated before it is purchased? 
p. Responses : 
1. Yes, in all cases, both on weapons systems and non-
weapons systems, we require an evaluation. There are limits 
to how effective that can be (i.e. with commercial components 
there is a built in warranty cost), but the manufacturers 
refuse to disclose the amount. Further, they refuse to trust 
us, either with the data or with an elimination of the 
warranty. Regardless of what the procuring contracting 
officer or Program Manager promise, they expect to be required 
to give warranty service somewhere along the line during the 
course of the program and, therefore, will not eliminate 
commercial warranty markups. 
2. Yes, it is part of the negotiations. 
3. For simple straight forward purchases, a warranty is 
usually just assumed to be more valuable to have that not 
have. For complex weapon systems, warranty provisions tend to 
be discussed and analyzed before being solicited from a 
113 
contractor; But, once requested, rarely is the Government 
prepared to change them. 
4. No, required by law. Contracts are negotiated for 
products and contract costs have warranty costs embedded. 
5. I do not have this information. 
6. No. 
7. No, more often than not, there is no empirical data to 
support any such analysis; No one technique whereby one can 
do so, no historical cost experience to evaluate, and no 
inclination to be influenced by the result - whatever that 
might indicate. 
8. Yes, it is not a business clearance approval requirement 
in our Acquisition Center. 
9. No, within the Government cost of a warranty (i.e. real 
cost) is really an "after the fact" consideration. 
10. No. 
11. No, based on my experience as an advisor to the aircraft 
engine warranty sub board, representative for the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force clearly indicated that there was/is much 
confusion over what constitutes effective evaluation. 
q. Question 9 
In your opinion, are waivers sought based on the 
results of the evaluation? 
r. Responses : 
1. Generally no. The general impression, whether deliberate 
or not was waivers wouldn't be approved so why bother? 
2. Yes, only two were granted at our organization. 
3. Once warranty provisions are solicited from a contractor, 
they are rarely changed. Waivers are rare. 
4. Yes, sought, but to my knowledge none have been approved. 
5. I do not have this information. 
6. Yes, sometimes, if good analysis has been done. 
7. No, the deviation process does not work. 
8. Yes, The frequency of waiver requests and rate of approval 
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or disapproval for all systems I components procured is unknown. 
9. No, The decision to go for a waiver is strictly political. 
10. No. 
11. No, Because there is a lack of understanding in what 
makes up a sound cost-benefit analysis, wa1vers are not 
sought; However, other considerations for seeking a waiver 
might be - mature, proved designs - provision that place undue 
burdens on the user. 
s. Question 10 
In your opinion, are thorough cost-benefit analysis 
performed to evaluate if a warranty is cost-effective? 
t. Responses: 
1. Yes. 
2. Yes, these are done by another Corrunand as part of an 
overall "ASARC" system requirements. They would be examining 
warranty costs as one item. They are not done specifically 
for warranties. 
3. Whether any cost-benefit analyses performed are thorough 
or not usually does drive the decision to include warranty 
provisions when the Government requests contractors to propose 
weapon systems. The Congressional and DOD oversight for the 
requirements process, including funding, may require a 
warranty provision no matter what a cost-benefit analyses may 
show. Corrunands performing the acquisition usually find it 
difficult or politically unwise to suggest that a warranty is 
not worth the projected cost. The cost-benefit analyses 
assumptions may be complex, not easily understood, and even 
perhaps optimistic about what may occur in the future. 
4. No. they are required by law. Costs are hidden, benefits 
difficult to predict with respect to operational 
effectiveness. Operational effectiveness is specified in the 
contract - how does warranty impact that? 
5. I do not have this information 
6. Yes, sometimes, cost-benefit analyses must reflect "real 
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world" environments. 
7. I don't know. 
8. Yes. 
9. No, once the decision has been made not to get a waiver, 
all other considerations are only paperwork exercises. 
10. No. 
11. No. 
u. Question 11 
In your opinion, is the expense for cost-benefit 
analysis justified by the results of the analysis? 
v. Responses: 
1. No, it is a waste of money. 
2. Yes, These are done by another Command as part of an 
overall "ASARC" system requirements. They would be examining 
warranty costs as one item. They are not done specifically 
for warranties. 
3 . It depends. If the Congress includes specific language 
that requires a warranty provision for a new complex weapon 
system, then it is usually pointless to develop a cost-benefit 
analysis that examines the issue. On the other hand, if the 
Government contemplates a warranty that will guarantee 
performance in the future (as opposed to a simple defects and 
workmanship warranty) , then a cost-benefit analysis can serve 
as a legitimate basis for identifying the value of the 
approach and even perhaps identifying alternatives that might 
be more cost-effective. 
4. No, Results are based on uncertain costs and impact on 
life cycle costs are unknown. 
5. I do not have this information 
6. Yes, sometimes, if done right. 
7. I would think so, but only if use 1s made of the 
information. 
8. Yes, Over the life cycle of a major component or airframe 
there is a substantial recurring operation and support cost 
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life cycle saving potential that will justify such analysis. 
9. No, Once the decision to award a contract with warranty 
clauses has been made, this is just a paperwork drill. 
10. No. 
11. Yes, since the cost of a warranty would far exceed that 
of a cost analysis, it doesn't seem prudent to sign up or 
purchase a warranty that might prove ineffective. 
w. Question l2 
In your opinion, is it difficult to get a waiver 
approved? 
x. Responses : 
1. Yes, it appears to be almost impossible. 
2. Yes, only two at our organization have been approved by 
DA. 
3. Yes, all waivers are difficult because they represent a 
reduction in requirements that neither the Acquisition Command 
nor the contractor are willing to admit also reduce costs. 
Warranty waivers are no different. 
4. Yes, as far as I know, none have been approved. 
5. I do not have this information. 
6. I don't know. 
7. Its virtually impossible to get a waiver. 
8. No, it should not be difficult if supported by an 
effective cost analysis. The frequency of waiver request and 
rate of approval/disapproval is unknown. 
9. Yes, the problem within our community is not necessarily 
getting a waiver approved, but getting approval from 
management to go for a waiver. 
10. No. 
11. Yes, although most comments I have heard from the 
military community indicate it is difficult. I believe this 
task would be more manageable if an analysis/study/model is 
based on sound conclusive data. 
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y. Question 13 
In your op1n1on, about how many waivers have you 
seen requested, evaluated, and granted? 
z. Responses: 
1. None, none, none. 
2. I haven't seen any granted or requested. I understand 2 
have been granted to us. I'm not sure how many were 
requested. 
3. None, none, none. Discussions have certainly taken place 
on how advisable it would be to tackle the waiver process but 
they usually don't get far. 
4. 7, 7, 0. Even when warranties are shown to be costly and 
ineffective, granting exemption means going against the law 
and accepting risk of criticism. 
5. I do not have this information. 
6. No experience. 
7. None, to explain this would fill a volume. 
8. I don't know. We do not have access to the data base to 
respond to this question. We have not processed waiver 
requests. 
9. 0,0,0, It could and should be done for a mature system 
with no history of significant QA problems. 
10. No comment. 
11. 1, 0, 0, While not involved in the waiver, we were 
informed of it. 
aa. Question 14 
In your opinion, how often are thorough cost-benefit 
analysis performed to evaluate if a warranty was in fact cost-
effective? 
ab. Responses: 
1. Don' t know anymore . When I was still a Procurement 
contracting Officer it was done "often". 
2. Often, Cost-benefit analysis are done with weapon system 
procurement due to the "law" . 
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3. I don't know how often this is done. 
4. Seldom, even when warranties are shown to be costly and 
ineffective. Granting exemption means going against the law 
and accepting risk of criticism. 
5. I do not have this information 
6. Seldom, "is it practical to administer"? 
7. No comment. 
8. We are in the EMD stage and have not procured a warranty. 
9. Seldom, Paperwork drills. 
10. No comment. 
11. Seldom, since my experience has been that the government 
does not fully exercise its rights under the terms of a given 
warranty, it would seem preposterous to go through the expense 
of a cost-benefit analysis when it is immediately evident. 
ac. Question l5 
Would you recommend meeting the intent of 
legislation of improved quality through a warranty? 
ad. Responses: 
1. You improve quality by improving the design and 
production processes, specifications up front or component 
testing as well control and vehicle testing, etc,etc. You get 
quality by doing it right. In a commercial product, the 
contractor has total control of the design and the markets he 
targets. He has an incentive to get it right or he won't 
last. In the military environment despite contractor 
claims they should be trusted -- history shows the same 
factors or forces simply do not apply. 
2. Yes, the warranty time gives our repair/replenishment group 
time to analyze the actual repair parts that need to be 
purchased versus the theoretical projections. This all'ows 
more accurate projections. 
3. Yes, for complex weapon systems. The Government should 
focus on requirements that cost-effectively cause contractors 
to design high reliability into their products at the outset 
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of a program. Designing elaborate warranty prov1s1ons misses 
the mark by focusing on the future rather than today. 
Spending today's dollars to requ1re the use of high 
reliability parts and components, infant mortality test 
screening, statistical process control, etc. is more effective 
than a warranty. Additionally, the government can monitor 
over time the effectiveness that these requirements have on 
the system reliability. Weapon systems that have reliability 
designed into them will simply fail less often in the future 
and lower the frequency and severity of warranty covered 
repa1rs. 
4. No, warranties do not ensure quality. contract provisions 
and incentives ensure quality, along with contractor "taming" 
and dedication for all concerned. 
5. No, quality is improved by process control and improvement 
- TQM - not buy legislation - not by warranty. 
6. Yes, we want quality and dollar saving - warranty is a 
"tool" to apply when appropriate. 
7. Yes, but I would recommend that reliability improvement 
warranties be used in development contracts, and be provided 
for as "options" that are priced that could be exercised 
unilaterally by the Government subsequent to deli very, and 
which are related to discrete aspects of performance for 
discrete functions (at the subsystem or replaceable unit 
level). 
8. No, Quality should be effected in the initial design, 
qualification, and prime/vendor production. Warranties will 
not be sold by any military or commercial contractor unless it 
yields an acceptable profit. There is no apparent reason to 
think that warranties have anything to do with enhancement of 
quality. Warranties are a repair vehicle, not a QA 
enforcement tool or a viable tool to cause redesign, unless 
part of a lot failure under a system type warranty. 
9. Yes, a warranty is a reasonable way to ensure good QA 
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performance on a new start system; However, once a system has 
been fielded and established a good track record, waivers 
should be sought. 
10. In the context of purchasing a commercial item, a 
warranty may have some marginal impact on quality and should 
be used as a factor in any competitive source selection. In 
the purchase of any major weapons system, I do not believe 
that a warranty will have any impact on quality. 
11. No, I do not feel the military, specifically the Army, 
has an effective system to administer and take advantage of 
the warranties it has on equipment today. There 1s no 
incentive at the user level to track warranties and complete 
the necessary paperwork. Warranties, with limitation , often 
expire before a piece of equipment is received by a unit due 
to the time spent in depot storage. 
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